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CONSUMER MEETS COMPUTER: AN ARGUMENT FOR
LIBERAL TRADEMARK PROTECTION OF COMPUTER
HARDWARE CONFIGURATIONS UNDER SECTION 43(a)
OF THE LANHAM TRADEMARK ACT
Competing manufacturers of desktop and personal computer products
frequently copy, or emulate, attributes of other manufacturers' hardware
and software innovations.' Until recently, litigation and related scholarly
commentary concerning computer product emulation primarily involved
copyright protection for computer software. 2 Copyright law, however,
provides no safeguards for the public's association of a particular com-
puter hardware manufacturer with various aspects of the hardware's
outward appearance, or configuration. 3 Trademark law is the most obvious
1. See J. MAYNARD, DICTIONARY OF DATA PROCESSING 66 (2d ed. 1981). "Emulation"
of computer products is the imitation of one computer product by another product. Id. The
imitating product uses the same data and programs that the imitated product uses and produces
the same results as the imitated system. Id. The copy of the original product is considered an
"emulator." Id.; see Digital Equip. Corp. v. C. Itoh and Co., No. 84-5317, slip op. at 5
(D.N.J. Sept. 20, 1985) (noting that market for computer products emulating Digital Equipment
Corporation computer hardware products, alone, represents multi-billion dollar industry).
"Hardware" refers to the electronically activated devices that a computer system com-
prises. J. MAYNARD, supra at 86. Hardware fundamentally consists of a central processing
unit (CPU), the portion of the system that actually computes, and various peripheral devices
for providing the user with access to the computer system's computational powers. A. SEmMA
& I. FLOREs, THE HANDBOOK OF COMPUTERs AND COMPUTING 201-06 (1984). Access devices
typically include some form of a video terminal containing a cathode ray tube and a keyboard.
A. SEMMAN & I. FLORES, supra at 201-06. The video terminal displays both the user's
instructions to the CPU and the computer's response to the instructions. Id. Through operation
of the keyboard, the computer user sends instructions to the CPU, and the user reacts to the
computer's response to the instructions. Id.; cf. N. MEROPOLIS, J. HowsLTr & G. ROTA, A
HISTORY OF COMPUTING IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY Parts II & IV (1980) (illustrating
differences between hardware of older, larger computer systems and hardware of newer desktop
or personal computers).
"Software" refers to stored computing instructions, or commands, capable of operating
the CPU. J. MAYNARD, supra at 173. The commands, stored on various forms of computer
readable media, stimulate activity in the system's CPU and frequently include instructions to
the system's user through the system's video terminal. See A. SEIDaM[ & I. FLoRas, supra at
206-08 (discussing various mediums for storage of software commands).
2. See, e.g., Luccarelli, The Supremacy Of Federal Copyright Law Over State Trade
Secret Law For Copyrightable Computer Programs Marked With A Copyright Notice, 3
COMPUTER L. J. 19 (1981) (discussing recent litigation over copyright protection for computer
software programs); Mantle, Trade Secret And Copyright Protection Of Computer Software,
4 COMPUTER L. J. 669 (1983) (same); Radcliffe, Recent Developments in Copyright Law
Related To Computer Software, 4 COMPUTER L. RP. 189 (1985) (same); Senter & Horowitz,
Sounding The Alarm: Sony And The Software Lock-Breaker, 5 CoMPUTER L. REP. 153 (1986)
(same); Note, Software Piracy And The Personal Computer: Is The 1980 Software Copyright
Act Effective?, 4 COMPUTER L. J. 171 (1983) (same).
3. See 17 U.S.C. §102(a) (1982) (congressional grant of copyright protection for
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source of protection for the public's associations of products with particular
manufacturers. 4 Trademark law provides protection for product markings, iden-
tifying products with particular manufacturers, that are registered on
the federal trademark registers pursuant to the Lanham Trademark Act
of 1946 (Lanham Act).5 Manufacturers, however, generally do not register
appearance features of the configurations of their products.6 In the last
decade, because of increasing consumer reliance on product appearance
to identify preferred products, section 43(a) of the Lanham Act has
emerged as a source of trademark protection for unregistered identity
devices including product configurations and trade dress.7 Consequently,
authors' creations); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cI. 8. (granting Congress power to promote
progress of science and arts by securing for limited time authors' exclusive rights to writings).
Federal copyrights, granted pursuant to federal constitutional authority and pursuant to the
1976 Copyright Act, provide protection to creators of literary and other original creations who
have reduced the creations to a tangible medium of expression. 17 U.S.C. §102(a) (1982). The
creator's exclusive rights to the creation last for the lifetime of the creator, plus fifty years.
Id. §302(a). Copyright law provides no protection for the public's association of particular
manufacturers with the outward appearances of certain products, associations that can be
extremely profitable to manufacturers. See infra notes 4 & 5 and accompanying text (explaining
that trademark law provides protection for public's manufacturer-product associations).
The outward appearance of a computer system is referred to as the computer's "product
configuration." See infra notes 27-216 and accompanying text (illustrating prevalent judicial
and scholarly reference to outward appearance of product features as "product configuration").
Computer products have emerged as consumer retail products. Id. Consequently, outward
appearances, or configurations, of computer products achieve the market recognition that
other consumer retail products achieve. Id.
4. See infra notes 5-8 and accompanying text (describing trademark protection for
public's associations of products with particular manufacturers). The federal system of trade-
mark protection is embodied in the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act). See 15
U.S.C. §§1051-1127 (1982) (codification of Lanham Act). The basic purpose of trademark
protection is to safeguard the public's association of a certain product with a particular
manufacturer by protecting the original merchant's identifying mark against other merchants'
use of confusingly similar identifying marks on competing products or services. See infra notes
41-53 and accompanying text (discussing purposes of Lanham Act as expressed in Lanham
Act's legislative history).
The primary procedure for a manufacturer to receive trademark protection for the
manufacturer's mark is to seek registration of the mark on the federal trademark registers. 15
U.S.C. §§1051-1096 (1982). Registration on the federal registers serves as constructive notice
to competing manufacturers not to use similar identifying marks. Id. Trademark protection
for unregistered marks and mark equivalents, however, is now possible under modern judicial
interpretations of §43(a) of the Lanham Act. See 15 U.S.C. §1125(a) (1982) (codification of
§43(a) of Lanham Act); see also infra note 7 and accompanying text (noting recent, widespread
acceptance in federal courts of §43(a) as source of protection for unregistered marks and mark
equivalents, such as product configurations).
5. Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§1051-1127 (1982); see supra note 4
and accompanying text (discussing registration of manufacturer marks on federal trademark
registers).
6. See infra notes 15 & 27 and accompanying text (illustrating relatively high proportion
of manufacturers' claims of trademark rights in unregistered features of product configurations
to manufacturers' attempts to register product configuration features).
7. See infra note 27 and accompanying text (noting that in last decade, nearly every
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section 43(a) may provide the needed trademark protection for unregis-
United States Circuit Court of Appeals has considered §43(a) claims for unregistered product
configurations or trade dress). Neither the language of §43(a) nor the Lanham Act's legislative
history, however, provide any indication of whether Congress intended that §43(a) should
serve as a broad source of protection for unregistered marks. See infra note 36 and accom-
panying text (setting forth and discussing language of text of §43(a)); see also infra notes 41-
53 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of §43(a) and noting judicial trans-
formation of §43(a) into source of trademark protection beyond extent inferable from language
of §43(a)).
Both product configurations and trade dress are eligible for trademark protection under
the modern judicial philosophy concerning §43(a). Note, The Problem Of Functional Features:
Trade Dress Infringement Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 82 CoLum. L. Ray. 77, 79
(1982). In the most general sense, product configuration refers to the outward appearance or
design of the shape of a product. Id. Trade dress refers to a product's packaging. Id. Under
early trademark law, courts consistently held that the product itself was ineligible for trademark
protection. See Oddi, The Functions of "Functionality" In Trademark Law, 22 Hous. L.
REv. 925, 929 [hereinafter Oddi, The Functions of "Functionality"I (citing Davis v. Davis,
27 F. 490, 492 (C.C.D. Mass. 1886), in which court held that "the trademark must be
something other than, and separate from, the merchandise"). The Restatement of Torts,
however, provided for a tort action against "unprivileged" product imitation. RESTATEmENT
OF TORTS, §§741-42 (1938). The federal courts, however, sparingly granted the protection
that the Restatement protection provided. See Oddi, The Functions of "Functionality, " supra,
at 931 & nn. 40 & 41 (indicating that Restatement provided remedy for unfair product copying
but also established strict criteria for obtaining remedy that few plaintiffs were able to meet).
The tendency of the federal courts, immediately after passage of the Lanham Act in 1946,
was to follow the old rule that virtually denied all protection for product configurations. Id.
at 93. A turning point came, however, in Application of Bourns, in which the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals denied trademark protection to a product configuration for
functionality but implied strongly that product configurations, in general, were proper subject
matter for trademark protection. Application of Bourns, 252 F.2d 582, 582-83 (C.C.P.A.
1958). Beginning with the case of Application of Deister Concentrator Company and continuing
into the eariy-1980s, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals delivered a line of registration
opinions in which the court acknowledged or followed the premise that product configurations,
which meet various trademark criteria, can serve as trademarks. Application of Deister
Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 500 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
In modern §43(a) litigation, the philosophical distinction between protection for trade
dress and protection for product configurations has become blurred, or perhaps moot, owing
to a considerable overlap of trade dress and product configurations. Note, supra, at 79. In
many cases, a product's outward appearance serves as the product's packaging and comprises
elements capable of identifying the manufacturer of the product. Id.; see Sno-Wizard Mfg. v.
Eisemann Prods., 791 F.2d 423, 426 n.3 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing and approving suggestion that
frequent overlap of product configurations and trade dress renders §43(a) protection applicable
to both); M. Kramer Mfg. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 447 (4th Cir. 1986) (referring to console
that housed video arcade game as trade dress); Freixenet, S.A. v. Admiral Wine & Liquor,
731 F.2d 148, 152. (3d Cir. 1984) (applying test that other federal courts employ in product
configuration disputes to labeling on wine bottle, which court referred to as trade dress). In
Digital Equipment Corp. v. C. Itoh, Inc., Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) sought §43(a)
protection for the shape of the housing for a computer video terminal. DEC, No. 84-
5317, slip op. at 1-2 (D.N.J. Sept. 20, 1985). The video terminal's housing, a component of
the product, served trade dress functions through the unusual shape of the housing that was
designed to catch the eye of potential purchasers. Id. at 9. The DEC product thus illustrates
the considerable overlap of trade dress and product configurations for computer products. Id.
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:283
tered computer product configurations. 8
The developing need for trademark protection of computer hardware
configurations has arisen from a demand for computers in the consumer
markets that did not exist before the mid-1970s. 9 In contrast with com-
8. See Digital Equip. Corp. v. C. Itoh (DEC), No. 84-5317, slip op. at 18 (D.N.J.
Sept. 20, 1985) (computer manufacturer's claim for §43(a) protection for unregistered computer
product configuration); See infra notes 87-212 and accompanying text (discussing facts of DEC
and ramifications of application of §43(a) to computer product configurations).
9. See N. METROPOLIS, J. HowLETT & G. ROTA, supra note 1, at 21-124 & 291-504. In
the early days of computers, generally only sophisticated business, scientific, and academic
establishments used computers. Id. Physically, the CPU was a dominating presence in most
computer facilities. See id. at 47 (describing early computer aptly named The COLOSSUS that
British government used from 1943-1975); see also supra note I and accompanying text
(defining CPU). The typical computer system's cubist housing and spinning computer tape
reels stereotyped computers with an intimidatingly cold and utilitarian appearance. See THE
AiRICA HERITAGE DIcTIoNARY 305 (2d college ed. 1982) (defining computer and providing
photographic illustration of stereotypical appearance of older, larger computer systems). Due
to the cost, bulk and general public unawareness of computer utility, consumers did not tend
to purchase computer products until after 1975. See Williams & Welch, A Microcomputing
Timeline, ByT, Sept. 1985, at 198-207 (discussing emergence since 1975 of personal computers
in American markets); see also Pountaln, Seventh Anniversary of Microcomputing, BYTE,
Sept. 1985, at 385-92 (discussing emergence of personal computers in United Kingdom since
1977).
The computer market has changed drastically since 1975. Williams & Welch, supra, at
198-207. Certain computer manufacturers now produce CPU, terminal and keyboard config-
urations that are comparable in size to small briefcases. Id. at 206-07; see Gilman, Companies
Buy More "Laptops" As Prices Fall Wall St. J., Aug. 29, 1986, at 1, col. 4 (describing laptop
computers and increasing popularity of laptops as laptop prices decrease). Computing capa-
bilities of the diminutive computers rival and exceed the capabilities of early room-filling
systems. Williams & Welch, supra, at 207. The extremely small systems, now known as
"laptops," are popular with frequent business travellers who use the laptops while in transit
on airlines and trains. Gilman, supra, at 1, col. 4. "Desktop" computers are actually one
phase behind laptops in the evolution of the computer and the related decreases in size.
Compare A. SEmMN & I. Fiopms, supra note 1, at 201-13 (describing desktops) with Gilman,
supra, at 1, col. 4 (describing laptops). Users must place desktop computers on a desk or
table top because of the desktop computer's size and weight. A. SEIMMAN & I. FLORES, supra
note 1, at 201-13. Desktops, nevertheless, are minute in comparison to the large systems of
pre-1975. Compare id. (describing desktops) with N. METROPOLIS, J. HowIETT & G. ROTA,
supra note 1, Parts II & IV (depicting very large, older systems).
In both the laptop and desktop system groups, the terminal and keyboard contribute
significantly to the overall size and appearance of the system. A. SEMMAN & I. FLOAS, supra
note 1, at 201-07; see Gilman, supra, at 1, col. 4 (describing configuration of laptop computers).
Currently, laptop systems are generally more expensive than desktop systems. Id. Consequently,
desktops remain more popular with consumers. Id. Price reduction, however, lags size reduction
by only a short period. Id. The phenomenon of price reduction lagging behind size reduction
ultimately will bring laptops within the consumer's price range. Id.
As recently as ten years ago, a computer buyer may have set eyes on his computer only
after the manufacturer or dealer assembled the system on the buyer's business, scientific, or
academic premises. Lewis, The Explosion In Computer Retailing, NATION'S Bus., July 1984,
at 49-50. The buyer frequently relegated the computer system to a back room, out of the sight
of all employees but those personnel having direct use of the system. Moving Into the Age of
Software, N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1984, §3, at 11, col. 4. Currently, computer systems of
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puter systems of a decade ago, which tended to be back office systems,
computers in the mid-1980s enjoy front office status and home use.' 0 The
general public now purchases computer products, primarily personal com-
puter systems, through retail channels." Computer purchasers, like con-
sumers in general, rely on product appearances to identify preferred
products. 2 Computer hardware manufacturers, however, like manufac-
turers in general, do not attempt to place product features on the
trademark registers.'
3
Until the mid-1970s, federal statutory trademark law primarily granted
protection only for federally registered manufacturer identity devices.14
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals has indicated that manufac-
greatly reduced size are front office and home products with increasingly universal use. Sanger,
Shakeout in Computer Stores, N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1984, at DI, col. 3; see Ditlea, When A
Computer Joins The Family, N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1979, at Cl, col. 1 (discussing home use
of personal computer). A potential buyer now may view his purchase alternatives displayed in
the front windows of computer shops. Lewis, The Explosion in Computer Retailing, supra, at
49-50; see Sanger, Shakeout in Computer Stores, supra, at D1, col. 3 (discussing abundance
of high visibility computer shops in consumer shopping districts). Computer shops frequently
take the form of boutiques, catering to particular market groups such as professionals or
home consumers. Sanger, supra, at Dl, col. 3. The modern computer environment has
motivated at least one manufacturer, Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC), to attempt to
create product recognition through a stylish or distinctive appearance in its access terminal,
keyboard, and personal computer product lines. Digital Equipment Corp. v. C. Itoh, Inc.,
No. 84-5317, slip op. at 13-14 (D.N.J. Sept. 20, 1985); see infra notes 87-109 and accompanying
test (discussing DEC's attempt to gain §43(a) protection for appearance of DEC products).
Office computer users frequently obtain a second computer system for their homes.
Ditlea, supra, at Cl, col 1. Certain software programs now render home computer systems
accessible to children. Id. Frequently, home computer purchasers want home systems to
resemble operationally an office computer for ease of transition. Sandberg-Diment, Those
Computer Matchmakers, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1984, at C4, col. 1. The desire for a comparable
home system arises from the user's natural aversion to unnecessary retraining on a different
computer. Id. Many users naturally are willing to purchase less expensive imitations of office
computers, provided that the operational characteristics of the imitation resemble the functions
of the office computer. Id.
10. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (noting emergence of computer systems
from back office environments to common use by general public).
11. Lewis, supra note 9, at 49-50.
12. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (describing consumer reliance on product's
outward appearance as basis for §43(a) trademark protection for product's appearance).
Consumer reliance on product appearance, whether the appearance consists of the product
configuration or the product's trade dress, gives rise to the trademark rights in unregistered
product configurations and trade dress recognizable under modern §43(a) jurisprudence. Id.;
see also infra notes 59-84 and accompanying text (discussing judicial tests in §43(a) actions
for determining whether trademark rights exist in product configurations and trade dress and
whether defendant's duplicative product infringes trademark rights).
13. See infra notes 87-107 and accompanying text (describing one computer hardware
manufacturer's attempt to invoke Lanham Act §43(a) as protection for unregistered computer
hardware appearance features).
14. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (noting that significant judicial recognition
of trademark protection for unregistered manufacturer identity devices has arisen only in last
decade).
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turers can register product shapes or configurations and product packaging
under federal trademark law. 15 Before the advent of section 43(a) as a
source of trademark protection for unregistered marks, manufacturers
who believed that their unregistered product configurations, or other
forms of unregistered marks, had been illegally copied depended on state
and federal common law of unfair competition for relief from infringe-
ment.' 6 The United States Supreme Court, however, in the 1964 compan-
ion cases of Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.' 7 and Compco Corp. v.
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.' stifled protection under state unfair competition
law.' 9 The Supreme Court held in Sears and Compco that when no federal
15. See, e.g., In Re Morton-Norwich Prods., 671 F.2d 1332, 1344 (C.C.P.A. 1982)
(registration of features of plastic spray bottle); Application of World's Finest Chocolate, Inc.,
474 F.2d 1012, 1015 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (registration of shape of candy bar package); Application
of Mogen David Wine Corporation, 328 F.2d 925, 932 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (registration of shape
of wine bottle).
16. See, e.g.,Ely-Norris Safe Co. v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 F.2d 603, 603 (2d Cir. 1925)
(common law action for illegal product duplication), rev'd 273 U.S. 132 (1927); American
Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 F. 281, 281 (6th Cir. 1900) (same); Hall v. Duart
Sales Co., 28 F. Supp. 838, 838 (N.D. Ill. 1939) (same); Armstrong Cork Co. v. Ringwalt
Linoleum Works, 235 F. 458, 458 (D.N.J. 1916) (same), rev'd 240 F. 1022 (3d Cir. 1917);
Borden's Condensed Milk Co. v. Horlick's Malted Milk Co., 206 F. 949, 949 (E.D. Wis.
1913) (same). See generally Bauer, A Federal Law Of Unfair Competition: What Should Be
The Reach of Section 43(a) Of The Lanham Act, 31 UCLA L. REv. 671, 672-78 (chronicling
late nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century unfair competition cases).
17. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
18. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
19. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964) (holding pursuant to
United States Constitution Supremacy Clause that state unfair competition law may not operate
to preempt federal patent law in product duplication action); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964) (same). In Sears, Roebuck & Company v. Stiffel Co., the
plaintiff, Stiffel, manufacturer of an expensive line of lamps, sought to preclude Sears Roebuck
& Co. (Sears) from selling inexpensive imitations of the Stiffel product line. Sears, 376 U.S.
at 226. Stiffel sought to prohibit Sears' imitations under Illinois unfair competition law. Id.
The lower federal courts had granted Stiffel protection on the basis that Stiffel had shown
that consumers were confused with respect to the source of the Sears lamps. Id. at 226-27.
The United States Supreme Court overturned the decisions of the lower federal courts. Id.
The Supreme Court noted that the lower courts had invalidated Stiffel's patents covering
features of the duplicated lamps. Id. at 226. The Supreme Court held that when unpatented
articles are in the public domain for failure to obtain federal patent protection, a state may
not invoke its own unfair competition law to supply protection because the plaintiff failed to
attain federal patent protection. Id. at 227-31. The Supreme Court held that the doctrine of
federal pre-emption of conflicting state law does not tolerate the encroachment on federal
patent law that results from the invocation of state unfair competition law under the circum-
stances of the Stiffel-Sears dispute. Id. at 232.
In Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting Inc., the United States Supreme Court addressed
a dispute between two parties that manufactured similar fluorescent lighting fixtures. Compco,
376 U.S. at 234. The Supreme Court in Compco extended the Sears doctrine by holding that
state law may not forbid competitors from copying at will any design feature that fails to
earn federal patent protection even when the duplicated feature serves to identify the original
manufacturer. Id. at 238. In Compco the Supreme Court did, however, carve out an exception
to the prohibition against state law protection of product features. Id. The Supreme Court
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patent or copyright protected an article, state law may not forbid the
copying of that article. 20 The Court reached this conclusion relying on
the doctrine of federal preemption of conflicting state law. 2' Sears and
Compco, therefore, forced manufacturers to seek another source of
protection for unregistered product shapes and configurations - section
43(a) .22
Eight years after the Sears and Compco opinions, in Bose Corp. v.
Linear Design Labs, Inc. ,23 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, although denying the plaintiff's claim for section 43(a)
protection for the shape of a high fidelity speaker, suggested that the
distinctive but unregistered shape of a product could serve as the product's
trademark under section 43(a). 24 Then, in 1976, in Truck Equipment
Service Co. v. Fruehauf Corp.,25 a truck body manufacturer convinced
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit that a distinctive,
but unregistered, truck body configuration warranted federal trademark
protection under section 43(a). 26  As a result, Bose, by suggesting
held that when a copied feature is nonfunctional, has acquired secondary meaning in the
marketplace, and is likely to confuse consumers with respect to the source of the imitation, a
state may invoke such precaigtions as a requirement of clear labeling on the imitation. Id.; see
infra notes 59-84 and accompanying text (discussing nature of tests for nonfunctionality,
secondary meaning, and likelihood of confusion). The nonfunctionality, secondary meaning
and likelihood of confusion tests are the primary tests the plaintiff must satisfy in current
§43(a) litigation. Id. Modern application of §43(a) effectuates federal product configuration
protection that the Sears-Compco doctrine forbids at the state level. See infra notes 120-212
and accompanying text (exploring widespread application of §43(a) in last decade as protection
for product configurations).
20. See Sears, 376 U.S. at 227-33 (holding that Supremacy Clause prohibits state unfair
competition law from contravening federal patent law); Compco, 376 U.S. at 238 (same); see
also supra note 19 and accompanying text (describing factual background, lower court rulings,
and United States Supreme Court's analyses in Sears and Compco cases).
21. Sears, 376 U.S. at 231; Compco, 376 U.S. at 238.
22. See Note, supra, note 7, at 82-83 (noting that plaintiffs challenging product imitation
after Sears and Compco decisions joined state law claims with §43(a) claims for false
designation of origin in hope that combined claims would fall outside Sears-Compco doctrine);
see also Comment, Product Simulation In The Eighth Circuit, 57 NEa. L. Rav. 91, 122-23
(1978). According to one commentator, federal courts have tended to ignore the beliefs of
certain scholarly authorities that the Sears-Compco doctrine negates §43(a) applicability to
product imitation. Id. Further, federal courts have used Sears-Compco as a basis for the
creation of a federal law of product configuration protection. Id.
23. 467 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1972).
24. Id. at 308-09. In Bose Corp. v. Linear Design Labs, Inc., the Second Circuit noted
that under §43(a), a product's appearance conceivably could function as the product's trademark
to indicate the product's origin, provided that the appearance satisfies specified trademark
criteria. Id.
25. 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1976) cert. denied 429 U.S. 861 (1976).
26. Id. at 1222. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Truck Equipment Corp.
v. Fruehauf Corp. held that the plaintiff's truck body configuration warranted trademark pro-
tection from duplication because the plaintiff demonstrated that features of the truck body
configuration satisfied traditional trademark tests. Id.
1987]
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section 43(a) as a novel source of trademark protection for product shapes,
and Fruehauf, by granting section 43(a) protection to a product configura-
tion, established precedent for subsequent section 43(a) claims by other
manufacturers seeking protection for unregistered product configurations and
trade dress.
27
The application of section 43(a) as protection for unregistered product
configurations arose as a result of the void left by the elimination of
state unfair competition law as a means of such protection following the
Sears-Compco decisions. 28 Sears-Compco rendered suspect all applications
of state unfair competition rules. 29 Consequently no body of law thor-
27. See Truck Equipment Service Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1210 (8th Cir.
1976) (seminal case holding precise duplication of product shape design prohibited by Lanham
Act §43(a)); Bose Corp. v. Linear Design Labs, Inc., 467 F.2d 304 ,308-09 (2d Cir. 1972)
(first case to suggest applying §43(a) to protect product configuration against precise dupli-
cation); see also Note, supra note 7 (citing Truck Equipment Service Co. as foundation for
modern federal court grants of §43(a) protection for features of product configurations).
Nearly every federal circuit has now considered §43(a) product configuration or trade dress
claims. See, e.g., Fisher Stoves, Inc. v. All Nighter Stove Works, 626 F.2d 193, 194-96 (1st
Cir. 1980) (denying claim for damages and injunction under §43(a) for outward appearance
of wood burning stove); LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 75-80 (2d Cir. 1985)
(granting preliminary injunction under §43(a) for overall appearance of lightweight luggage);
Freixenet, S.A. v. Admiral Wine & Liquor, 731 F.2d 148, 151-53 (3d Cir. 1984) (denying
preliminary injunction under §43(a) for wine bottle shape, color, and labeling); M. Kramer
Mfg. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 447-50 (4th Cir. 1986) (granting §43(a) protection for glass
frontpiece and console of video game); Sno-Wizard Mfg. v. Eisemann Prods., 791 F.2d 423,
425-30 (5th Cir. 1986) (denying §43(a) protection for ice shaving dessert machine); Kwic-Site
Corp. v. Clear View Mfg., 758 F.2d 167, 178-80 (6th Cir. 1985) (denying §43(a) protection
for rifle sight mounts); W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 337-48 (7th Cir. 1985)
(correcting district court's jury instruction in §43(a) claim for protection of shape of stacked
office trays); Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1215-23 (8th Cir.
1976) (granting §43(a) protection for overall appearance of twin hopper bottomed grain truck
semitrailer) cert. denied 429 U.S. 861 (1976); Transgo, Inc. v. AJAC Transmission Parts
Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1015-21 (9th Cir. 1985) (addressing plaintiff's claim for §43(a) protection
for auto repair parts) cert. denied 106 S.Ct. 802 (1986); University of Ga. Athletic Assn. v.
Laite, 756 F.2d 1535, 1540-43 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that distinctive bulldog depiction on
beer can violated University's §43(a) trademark rights in particular bulldog depictions); Litton
Sys. Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1444-49 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (denying §43(a) protection
for microwave oven doors).
28. 1 J. GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE, §2.13[4], at 2-115 & -116, &
§7.02, at 7-10 (1983) (discussing federal courts' willingness to use §43(a) to fill in "gap" in
legal protection against copying distinctive, but unregistered, product configurations).
29. See Note, supra note 7, at 83 n.45 (noting stifling effect of Sears-Compco opinion
on unfair competition claims). The Sears-Compco doctrine should only bar actions in which
plaintiffs attempt to invoke state law to effect state equivalents of patents, the duration or
coverage of which extends beyond the duration and coverage of the federal versions. Compare
Sears, 376 U.S. at 231 (stating rule that state law may not forbid copying of federally
unpatented article) with Compco, 376 U.S. at 238 (holding that factors outside contemplation
of federal patent law may allow state prohibition of product duplication in certain instances).
The Compco Court acknowledged the states' power to impose unfair competition liability in
instances when a product duplicator relies on the original manufacturer's reputation in the
marketplace to deceive the public with respect to a product's source of origin. Id. The doctrine
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oughly protected unregistered product configurations. 0 The twelve years
that passed between the issuance of the Sears and Compco opinions in
1964 and the Eighth Circuit opinion in Fruehauf in 1976, which granted
section 43(a) protection for trademark rights in a truck body configura-
tion, reflect the gap in legal protection for unregistered product config-
urations.' Although no federal court has stated expressly that section
43(a) fills a legal void that resulted from the Sears-Compco doctrine, the
practical result of twenty years of litigation since Sears-Compco is that
section 43(a) does fill the gap.
3 2
that the United States Supreme Court established in Sears and Compco, however, has deterred
state unfair competition actions regarding product configuration or trade dress infringement
in other areas including identity or source-of-origin protection. Note, supra note 7, at 83.
Although state unfair competition claims still accompany §43(a) federal claims for protection
of unregistered marks, federal appellate courts consistently dispose of the action by ruling on
the federal claims only and avoiding the state lav claims. See, e.g. Sno-Wizard Mfg.v.
Eisemann, 791 F.2d 423, 424 (5th Cir. 1986) (ruling on plaintiff's §43(a) claim without
addressing accompanying state unfair competition claim); Kwic-Site Corp. v. Clear View Mfg.,
758 F.2d 167, 170 (6th Cir. 1985) (same); Freixenet, S.A. v. Admiral Wine & Liquor, 731
F.2d 148, 150 (3d Cir. 1984) (same).
30. 1 J. GmsoN, supra note 28, §2.13[4], at 2-115 & 116, & §7.02, at 7-10.
31. Id.
32. Id. One commentator has noted that the evolution of §43(a) as protection for
unregistered product configurations is similar to the evolution of other ambiguous federal
statutory provisions. Id. §7.02, at 7-10. When statutory language does not address expressly
the facts of a dispute, the federal courts derive substantive law from the underlying policy of
the act using federal precedent where available, and from comparable state precedent that best
effectuates the relevant federal policy. Id. In the case of §43(a) trademark protection for
unregistered product shapes, ample federal precedent exists in opinions concerning registration
of product shapes. See e.g. In re Morton-Norwich Prods., 671 F.2d 1332, 1344 (C.C.P.A.
1982) (acknowledging that registrable trademark rights can exist in configuration of plastic
spray bottle); Application of World's Finest Chocolate, 474 F.2d 1012, 1015 (C.C.P.A. 1973)
(holding that shape of candy bar package was proper subject for registered trademark
protection); Application of Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925, 932 (C.C.P.A. 1964)
(holding that wine bottle configuration was capable of being registered even during life of
design patent covering bottle's design). The federal courts have been willing to expand the
meaning of the terminology in §43(a). See infra notes 36-58 and accompanying text (noting
language of §43(a) and necessity for great expansion of §43(a) language to cover product
configuration claims). While Congress arguably intended to limit the use of the word "origin"
in §43(a) to geographical origin, various federal courts have interpreted origin to include
product source. 1 J. GILSON, supra note 28, §7.0211] at 7-11; see infra note 36 and accompanying
text (discussing language of §43(a)).
Speculation may arise regarding whether the Sears-Compco doctrine bars actions brought
under a federal unfair competition law, such as modern §43(a) litigation, that grants trademark
protection to unpatented product configurations and trade dress. See Truck Equipment Services
Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1214 (8th Cir, 1976) (raising issue of whether Sears-
Compco doctrine bars use of §43(a) to prohibit duplication of unpatented product configura-
tion). In Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., the United States Supreme
Court implied that no bar exists relating to federal unfair competition law. Inwood Labora-
tories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850-851, 853 & 858 (1982). The Inwood
Laboratories Court addressed as a collateral issue a trade dress infringement claim under
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During the last decade, in which computers evolved into consumer
products, section 43(a) experienced a vast expansion in applicability to a
variety of unregistered identity marks, symbols and terms as well as in
applicability to product configurations and trade dress. 3 The expanded
applicability of section 43(a), however, is marked by varied and inconsistent
judicial interpretation.14 The inconsistency is inevitable because neither the
language of section 43(a) nor the legislative history provide any definitive
guidance with respect to congressional intent regarding the application of
section 43(a).
35
The heading of section 43(a) simply states: "[flalse designations of
origin and false descriptions forbidden[.] ' '3 6 Section 43(a) prohibits false
descriptions and representations, including words and other symbols.3 7
Section 43(a) authorizes a civil action against persons placing into the
stream of commerce any items bearing false designations of origin, or
false descriptions or representations. 3' The plaintiff in the civil action
may be any person who believes that he has suffered or will suffer damage
from a false description or representation.3 9 Alternatively, the plaintiff
§43(a). Id. The Inwood Laboratories Court remanded the §43(a) claim for consideration on
its merits and referred to the Sears and Compco cases only in re-announcing certain §43(a) action
standards and not as a bar to §43(a) actions for product or trade dress duplication. Id.; see
also Truck Equipment Services Co., 536 F.2d at 1214 (arguing that Sears-Compco doctrine
is not controlling in §43(a) actions). The court in Truck Equipment Services Company observed
that the issue before the United States Supreme Court in both the Sears and Compco cases
was the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. Id.
33. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing evolution of computers as
consumer products); supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing conceptual difference
between product configuration and trade dress, but noting current absence of any practical
significance to distinction for §43(a) purposes).
34. See Bauer, supra note 16, at 671-72, 685 (discussing inconsistencies in tests that
federal courts employ in. addressing §43(a) claims); see also infra notes 59-84 and accompanying
text (describing tests that courts employ in §43(a) claims).
35. See infra notes 41-53 and accompanying text (demonstrating lack of guidance in
Lanham Act legislative history with respect to congressional intent regarding manner and cases
in which §43(a) should apply).
36. 15 U.S.C. §1125(a) (codification of §43(a) of 1946 Lanham Trademark Act). The
text of § 43(a) reads:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any goods
or services, or any container or containers for goods, a false designation of origin, or
any false description or representation, including words or other symbols tending
falsely to describe or represent the same, and shall cause such goods or services to
enter into commerce, and any person who shall with knowledge of the falsity of
such designation of origin or description or representation cause or procure the same
to be transported or used in commerce or deliver the same to any carrier to be
transported or used, shall be liable to a civil action by any person doing business
in the locality falsely indicated as that of origin or in the region in which said
locality is situated, or by any person who believes that he is or is likely to be





may be any person doing business in the geographical area falsely des-
ignated as the geographical area of origin of the disputed item.
40
The legislative history underlying the 1946 Lanham Trademark Act is
equally uninformative regarding any congressional intent controlling the
application of section 43(a) protection to product configurations. 41 In
1924 Congress began consideration of a series of bills that culminated in
the passage of the Lanham Trademark Act in 1946.42 No congressional
committee report from the year of the Lanham Act's enactment specifi-
cally addresses section 43(a). 43 The Senate Committee on Patent's only
published report in 1946 regarding the trademark bill is no more than a
summarization of the general policies underlying the bill." The report
summarizes congressional deliberation of Lanham Act policy over the
1924-1946 period.4 1 Congressional committee reports prior to 1946 offer
no additional insight into congressional intent underlying section 43(a).
46
40. Id.
41. See S. REP. No. 1333 79tl Cong., 2d Sess., [hereinafter 1946 SENATE REPORT]
reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE. CONG. SERv. 1274, 1274-78 (explaining broad policies underlying
Lanham Trademark Act with no explanation for any specific provisions of Lanham Act); see
also infra notes 41-53 (discussing lack of guidance in Lanham Act legislative history with
respect to purpose of §43(a)).
42. Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§1051-1127 (1982); see 3 J. GILSON,
supra note 28, at Vol. III introduction (noting 22-year congressional consideration of trademark
policy prior to passage of the Lanham Act).
43. 1946 SENATE REPORT, supra note 41, at 1274-78.
44. Id.
45. See id. at 1274-78 (emphasizing trademark policy of protecting consumers and
manufacturers against confusion in marketplace over product origin).
46. See Hearings on S. 4811 Before the Senate Comm. on Patents, 69th Cong., 2d Sess.
71 (1927) [hereinafter 1927 SENATE HEARINGs]; Hearings on S. 2679 Before the Joint Comms.
on Patents, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. 49-51, 104, 127-28 (1925) [hereinafter 1925 JOINT HEARINGS].
The only specific discussions of the provision that ultimately became §43(a) were in two early
hearings of the Congressional Patent Committees. See 1927 SENATE HEARNos, supra, at 71;
1925 JoINT HEARINGS, supra, at 49-51, 104, 127-28. In its consideration of S. 4811, proposing
enactment of the trademark statute, the Senate Committee on Patents read into the record a
letter from Edward S. Rogers discussing the meaning of the provision. See 1927 SENATE
HEAINGoS, supra, at 71; see also Derenberg, Federal Unfair Competition Law At The End Of
The First Decade Of The Lanham Act: Prologue Or Epilogue?, 32 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1029,
1036-37 (1957) [hereinafter Derenberg, Federal Unfair Competition Law] (quoting from Rogers'
1927 letter to Senate Committee on Patents and referring to Rogers' letter as "root and
explanation" of extant §43(a)). Rogers, in 1927, was chairman of the American Bar Association
Section on Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law. Id. at 1036. Rogers indicated that the bill
included the provision to bring the United States into conformity with various international
trade conventions to which the United States was a signatory. 1927 SENATE HEARINGS, supra,
at 71. The trade conventions called for the prevention of entry into signatory countries of
goods with counterfeit trademarks, marks infringing on registered trademarks and goods
bearing false indications of geographical origin. Id. Rogers' letter also indicated that the
provision, which ultimately became §43(a), addressed the mismarking of merchandise as well
as the infringement of trademarks. Id. Finally, Rogers' letter noted that the provision prohibited
not only false designations of origin but also any false descriptions or representations. Id. In
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One commentator characterizes section 43(a) as a federal law of unfair
competition, but argues that Congress never intended that section 43(a)
serve as a catch-all. 47 Another commentator asserts that Congress intended
section 43(a) to eliminate common law impediments to unfair competition
actions, primarily claims of false advertising. 4 The same commentator
further notes that section 43(a) brought the United States into conformity
with liberal trademark law standards to which the United States had
agreed to bind itself as a signatory to various treaties and conventions. 49
Another commentator presents an argument that Congress never intended
that section 43(a) should become a broad source of protection for unre-
gistered trademarks. 50 According to the commentator's argument, which
focuses on the language of the section, the wrong that Congress meant
to address through section 43(a) was the false designation of geographical
origin 1.5 The commentator asserts that if Congress had meant for section
43(a) to be a broad source of unregistered trademark protection, section
43(a) terminology would have adopted language similar to the language
of section 32 of the Act, which deals with infringement of registered
trademarks.5 2 Section 32 prohibits the "reproduction, counterfeit, copy
or colorable imitation of a registered mark." 53
Despite the ambiguous legislative background, section 43(a) now pro-
vides protection for unregistered trademarks of a variety of forms.54 As
a result of the judicial willingness to expand application of section 43(a),
the provision currently protects unregistered product configurations if the
effect the Report sets forth nothing more than the terminology that ultimately became the
terminology of §43(a) of the Lanham Act in 1946. See Lanham Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C.
§1125(a) (1982) (text of §43(a) mirrors language of 1927 SENATE REPoRT).
47. See Derenberg, supra note 46, at 1039 (arguing that points made in Edward S.
Rogers' 1927 letter to Senate Committee on Patents constitute limits on application of §43(a));
see also supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing contents of Rogers' letter to Senate
Committee) Professor Derenberg, now recognized as an eminent authority on the Lanham
Act, lamented that courts by 1957 had begun to apply §43(a) to factual situations clearly
outside the intended scope of the provision. Id.
48. Bauer, supra note 16, at 680 (discussing congressional intent behind §43(a)).
49. Id.; see also supra note 46 and accompanying text (noting that §43(a) legislative
history indicates that one purpose of §43(a) was to bring United States into conformity with
international conventions).
50. 1 J. GiLsoN, supra note 28, §7.02, at 7-9 (discussing congressional intent behind
§43(a)).
51. Id.; see supra note 36 and accompanying text (setting forth text of §43(a)).
52. 1 J. GILsoN, supra note 28, §7.02, at 7-9; see 15 U.S.C. §1114 (1982) (codification
of §32 of Lanham Act proscribing infringements of registered trademarks).
53. Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §1114 (1982). But see Bauer, supra note
16, at 680 n.42 (arguing that policy language from Lanham Act §44 applies to §43(a)). The
language in §44 closely parallels the terminology of §32. Compare Lanham Trademark Act of
1946, 15 U.S.C. §1114 (1982) (§32 covering infringement of registered marks) with Lanham
Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §1126 (1982) (§44 covering trademark rights and protection
pursuant to international conventions).
54. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (indicating consideration of §43(a) product
configuration and trade dress claims by nearly every federal circuit).
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original producer can show that a copy does not compete fairly with the
original product, but instead capitalizes unfairly on the plaintiff's estab-
lished product recognition. 5 The only clear alternative for protecting product
appearance is the design patent . 6 As one commentator has noted, how-
ever, the prevailirig standard for earning a design patent is that the
product must demonstrate a high level of artistic ingenuity. 7 The pre-
vailing standard is therefore too stringent for a manufacturer seeking not
to make an artistic statement, but merely to protect product identity. 8
Federal circuit courts of appeal performing section 43(a) analyses
generally rely on three tests to determine whether a duplicating manufac-
turer has infringed the original manufacturer's trademark rights in the
disputed product configuration. 59 Specifically, the federal courts perform
the nonfunctionality test, the secondary meaning test and the likelihood
of confusion test,60 The federal circuit courts have indicated that a
plaintiff's duplicated product configuration must satisfy all three tests in
order for the plaintiff to succeed in a section 43(a) action involving
product configurations or trade dress.
61
55. See supra notes 129-51 and accompanying text (noting emphasis of federal courts in
§43(a) actions on fostering competition while preventing unfair product copying). Section 43(a)
cases involving product configurations are only one of several types of cases based on §43(a).
See infra notes 87-109 and accompanying text (discussing Digital Equipment Corporation v. C.
Itoh and Company, No. 84-5317, slip op. at 25 (D.N.J. Sept. 20, 1985), in which plaintiff unsuccess-
fully asserted that competitor's use of similar product name was §43(a) (violation); infra note
180 (noting Univ. of Ga. Athletic Assn. v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535 (11th Cir. 1985), in which plain-
tiff athletic association successfully asserted that beer distributor's use of bulldog depiction on
beer cans infringed association's bulldog mascot under §43(a)); see also supra note 15 and accom-
panying text (observing that trademark protection for product configurations is also possible through
registration of configurations).
56. See Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §171 (1982) (providing for grant of design patents for
product designs satisfying specified criteria). The requirements for obtaining design patents for
a product feature include novelty, nonobviousness, and, most significantly, ornamentality. Id.
But see infra note 57 and accompanying text (noting that courts have imposed high artistic
standard in meeting requirements for obtaining design patent).
57. 1 J. GnUsoN, supra note 28, at 2-104; see G.B. Lewis, Co. v. Gould Prods., 436
F.2d 1176, 1178-79 (2d Cir. 1971) (noting requirement of significant artistic achievement for
design patents).
58. See infra note 27 and accompanying text (citing various examples of product
configuration types, including truck bodies and rifle sight mounts, for which §43(a) protection
was sought, and which have no clear practical need for attainment of artistic distinction).
59. See 1 J. GiLsoN, supra note 28, at 2-114-14.1 (discussing universal usage by federal
courts of non-functionality, secondary meaning, and likelihood of confusion tests in §43(a)
claims); Bauer, supra note 16, at 708-28 (same); infra notes 60-77 and accompanying text
(discussing nonfunctionality, secondary meaning, and likelihood of confusion tests applied in
§43(a) product configuration and trade dress infringement actions).
60. See infra notes 62-67 and accompanying text (discussing nonfunctionality test); infra
notes 68-71 and accompanying text (discussing secondary meaning test); infra notes 72-76 and
accompanying text (discussing likelihood of confusion test).
61. See Litton Sys. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1444-45 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (asserting
that application of three tests is mandatory throughout federal circuit courts of appeal); see
also 1 J. GILSON, supra note 28, §7.0211], at 7-10 to 7-14 & §7.02[2], at 7-21 to -22 (noting
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The nonfunctionality test determines whether the duplicated feature
has some utilitarian function as opposed to merely a source identification
or cosmetic function. 62 The premise of the nonfunctionality doctrine is
that because of the widely recognized policy of free competition with
regard to functional product characteristics, a functional or utilitarian
feature of a product is not proper subject matter for trademark protec-
tion.63 According to the nonfunctionality doctrine, functional or utilitarian
features fall under the domain of patent law, not trademark law.
64
Supported by the policy that federal law should stimulate innovation,
patents grant to inventors monopolies over functional innovations, but
only for a limited time. 65 Upon expiration of the time limit, patent
protection lapses and the initially subordinated policy of free competition
takes over as the dominant policy. 66 According to the prevailing rationale,
that plaintiff must satisfy three tests in order to prevail in §43(a) claim). But see University
of Ga. Athletic Assn. v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535, 1535 (1lth Cir. 1985) (holding, in case involving
similar "representative" symbols, that plaintiff need only show secondary meaning for "de-
scriptive marks"). In University of Ga. Athletic Assn. v Laite, the Eleventh Circuit held that
plaintiffs claiming §43(a) coverage for suggestive or arbitrary marks embodied in trade dress,
such as the bulldog mascot involved in the case, need not prove secondary meaning. Id. The
Laite court did not indicate whether the suggestive or arbitrary marks exception would apply
in a product configuration case in which plaintiff argued that it arbitrarily chose the allegedly
infringed product design. Id.; see also infra notes 120-37 and accompanying text (arguing
against use of nonfunctionality test in trademark cases).
62. See Oddi, supra note 7, at 925-33 (defining functionality and explaining policy of
nonfunctionality in trademark law); Bauer, supra note 16, at 717-28 (same); Note, supra note
7, at 80-90 (same); The United States Circuit Courts of Appeal offer varied explanations of
the nonfunctionality doctrine. See, e.g., W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 338-39 (7th
Cir. 1985) (nonfunctionality test serves to screen out from trademark protection design features
that are "intrinsic to the entire product"); LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71,
75 (2d Cir. 1985) (nonfunctionality test performed to determine whether feature is essential to
product's use and thus ineligible for §43(a) trademark protection as opposed to feature that
merely identifies product); United States Golf Assn. v. St. Andrews Sys., Data-Max, Inc., 749
F.2d 1028, 1033 (3d Cir. 1984) (nonfunctionality test serves to determine whether duplicated
feature is part of "the 'function' served" by the product, and thus not eligible for trademark
protection); cf. Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343-44 (9th Cir. 1952). In
Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., the Ninth Circuit, ruling on four china pattern duplications,
developed the concept of aesthetic functionality. Id. The Pagliero court ruled that where the
ornamental, or cosmetic, features of an item are the essential selling features of the item, the
features are functional. Id. The Pagliero aesthetic functionality concept currently is inapplicable
in computer product duplication disputes because the ornamental aspects of computer hardware
presently do not serve as essential selling features of the hardware. See supra note 9 and
accompanying text (discussing current status of computer product in American society).
63. Oddi, supra note 7, at 961.
64. Bendekgey, Trademark Rights In Computer Product Configurations: If It Looks
Like a DEC and Feels Like a DEC, Does It Infringe a DEC, 3 THE COMUTER LAw. 15, 15;
see 1 J. GILSON, supra note 28, sec. 2.13, at 2-107.
65. See 35 U.S.C. §§101, 154 (codification of provisions of 1952 Patent Act describing
fundamentals of patent protection and seventeen year period of patent validity).
66. Id. In contrast to patent protection, trademark protection lasts for an indefinite
duration, which, in practice, lasts as long as the original manufacturer utilizes the protected
COMPUTER HARD WARE CONFIGURATIONS
granting trademark protection to functional features has the effect of
granting a surrogate patent monopoly over the feature for an infinite
duration in contravention of the patent policy of limiting the duration of
functional monopolies.
67
The second test that federal courts apply in most section 43(a) analyses
is a determination of whether the item for which trademark protection is
sought has acquired secondary meaning. 6 Secondary meaning attaches to
product features when purchasers have come to associate the product
feature with a particular manufacturer. 69 The policy underlying the sec-
ondary meaning test is to prohibit copying of a product's feature when
the ordinary consumer has come to associate the feature with a particular
manufacturer. 70 The rationale of the secondary meaning test is that
trademark interests are contravened if consumers are confused or deceived
with respect to the source of manufacture of purchased goods.
71
The third test in section 43(a) product configuration and trade dress
analyses is the test for a likelihood of confusion.72 The name of the test
mark or product configuration. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text (discussing
trademark protection and duration).
67. See Oddi, supra note 7, at 926-27 (contrasting patent and trademark law and noting
potential for patent and trademark policy clash in absence of nonfunctionality doctrine).
Application of the nonfunctionality test in §43(a) actions is the subject of consi4erable
controversy among the federal circuit courts of appeal. See infra notes 129-51 and accompanying
text (discussing proper roles of nonfunctionality test in context of personal computer products).
68. See J. GiLoN, supra note 28, §2.09, at 2-68 to 2-75 & §7.02[1], at 7-13 to 7-14
(explaining secondary meaning test and noting that plaintiff must satisfy test to prevail in
§43(a) claim); see also infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text (explaining nature and
application of secondary meaning test in §43(a) analyses).
69. See Truck Equipment Service Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1219 (8th Cir.
1976). The Eighth Circuit in Truck Equipment Service Company v. Fruehauf Corporation held
that secondary meaning exists when a mark or symbol, through one manufacturer's long and
exclusive use and advertising, becomes so associated in the public's mind with that manufac-
turer's goods that the mark or symbol serves to identify original manufacturer and distinguish
the original manufacturer's goods from the goods of others. Id.; see Freixenet, S.A. v. Admiral
Wine & Liquor Co., 731 F.2d 148, 152 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that secondary meaning exists
where in minds of public, primary significance of product feature is to identify source of
product rather than merely identify product itself); LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp. 754 F.2d
71, 78 (2d Cir. 1985) (same).
70. Comment, supra note 22, at 126.
71. Bauer, supra note 16, at 709.
72. See J. GSoN, supra note 28, 7.02[1], at 7-12 (§43(a) plaintiff must prove likelihood
of confusion); see also 2 J. McCARrHY, TRaEmARKs AND UrNFAm COMPETIToN, §23.1, at 34
(1973) (stating that likelihood of confusion test is "keystone" or basic test, both statutorily
and at common law, for trademark rights infringement). Federal courts have explained and
applied the likelihood of confusion test in §43(a) actions. See, e.g. Litton Systems, 728
F.2d at 1445 (applying likelihood of confusion test to duplications of microwave oven
configuration); Fisher Stoves, 626 F.2d at 194 (applying likelihood of confusion test to
duplication of wood burning stove); Truck Equip. Serv., 536 F.2d at 1220 (applying likelihood
of confusion test to duplication of truck body). See generally, Bauer, supra note 16, at 696
(noting that most frequent basis for court's refusal to find §43(a) infringements is little
likelihood of confusion between parties' marks).
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derives from the fundamental policy of the Lanham Act to protect
manufacturers and the public from confusion with respect to product
origin.73 The plaintiff must show that the defendant's duplication infringes
the plaintiff's trademark rights in the product configuration by causing
consumers to mistakenly determine that the plaintiff is the manufacturer
of the defendant's product. 74 Regardless of the extent of the secondary
meaning that a product feature has achieved, the feature does not warrant
protection from an imitation that is sufficiently different to avoid con-
fusion.7 1 The likelihood of confusion test as a test for trademark infringe-
ment originated in cases involving alleged infringements of federally
registered trademarks.
76
Most federal court opinions regarding section 43(a) claims state that
the plaintiff must satisfy all three of the recognized tests, but fail to
explain whether the order in which the courts perform the tests is of any
significance or whether the tests fit within a particular analytical frame-
work. 77 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Sno-
Wizard Manufacturing v. Eisemann Products, Co.,71 however, recognized
that a proper section 43(a) analysis follows a particular analytical frame-
work and, consequently, requires performance of the three tests in a
particular order. 79 In Sno-Wizard, the Fifth Circuit addressed the com-
plaint of a manufacturer of an ice confection machine that a competitor
precisely, and therefore unfairly, duplicated the appearance of the ma-
73. See supra notes 41-53 and accompanying text (discussing Lanham Act trademark
policies).
74. J. GUsON, supra note 28, 7.02[1], at 7-12 (§43(a) plaintiff must prove likelihood of
confusion); see also Sno-Wizard Mfg. v. Eisemann Prods., 791 F.2d 423, 425 (5th Cir. 1986)
(noting that federal circuit courts of appeal employ likelihood of confusion test to determine
whether trademark rights have been infringed).
75. See Freixenet, S.A. v. Admiral Wine and Liquor, 731 F.2d 148, 151 (3d Cir. 1984)
(holding §43(a) inapplicable if plaintiff makes no showing of likelihood of confusion regardless
of extent of secondary meaning proven); see also 1 J.GrisON, supra note 28, §2.09, at 2-68 to
2-75 (explaining relationship between secondary meaning and potential for consumer confusion,
which is subject of likelihood of confusion test).
76. See Bauer, supra note 16, at 687 n.68 (noting that courts borrowed likelihood of
confusion test for §43(a) analyses from Lanham Act §32 registered trademark infringement
cases); 2 J. McCARTIY, supra note 72, §23.1, at 34 (noting that likelihood of confusion test
has always been basic test for infringement of trademark rights in registered mark cases).
77. See Kwic-Site Corp. v. Clear View Mfg., 758 F.2d 167, 178 (6th Cir. 1985) (stating
that plaintiff must satisfy tests of likelihood of confusion, nonfunctionality, and secondary
meaning and first performing likelihood of confusion test); Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf
Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1217-21 (8th Cir. 1976) (performing nonfunctionality test, secondary
meaning test, and likelihood of confusion test, respectively) cert. denied 429 U.S. 861 (1976);
see also Litton Sys. Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (citing
Fruehauf for necessity of performing three tests, but with no reference to particular order).
78. 791 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1986).
79. Sno-Wizard, 791 F.2d at 425 (setting forth an analytical framework for §43(a)
analyses); see infra note 81 and accompanying text (setting forth Sno- Wizard court's explanation
of analytical framework for §43(a) analyses).
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chine.80 Within the framework recognized by the Sno-Wizard court, two
of the tests, nonfunctionality and secondary meaning, serve as threshold
tests to determine whether any trademark rights exist in the plaintiff's
product configuration." Subsequent to the determination that trademark
rights exist, the likelihood of confusion test serves to determine whether
the trademark rights have been infringed . 2 Under the framework, failure
to satisfy either the nonfunctionality test or the secondary meaning test
indicates that no trademark rights exist capable of infringement and
renders the likelihood of confusion test moot." No express rationale,
however, supports performing the two threshold tests in a particular
order.
84
As a result of the federal courts' varied applications of the three section
43(a) tests, in conjunction with the lack of legislative guidance, incon-
sistency marks section 43(a) case history.85 The recent ruling of the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey on a section 43(a) claim
80. Sno-Wizard, 791 F.2d at 425.
81. Id. In Sno-Wizard Mfg. v. Eisemann Prods., the Fifth Circuit stated that the court
must make two inquiries. Id. According to the Sno-Wizard court, the first inquiry determines
whether the product configuration or trade dress qualifies for protection, that is whether the
configuration or trade dress embodies trademark rights. Id. Secondly, the court must determine
whether the defendant has infringed the trademark rights embodied in the product configuration
or whether trade dress has been infringed. Id. The first inquiry comprises the issues of
functionality and distinctiveness or secondary meaning. Id. The second inquiry comprises a
"digits of confusion" test to determine whether a likelihood of confusion exists. Id. According
to the Sno-Wizard court, the likelihood of confusion inquiry is the key to finding a violation
of §43(a)). Id.
82. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (citing Fifth Circuit in Sno-Wizard for
proposition that likelihood of confusion test is second level of two-level analytical framework
in §43(a) analyses).
83. Id. The analytical framework advocated by the court in Sno- Wizard Manufacturing
v. Eisemann Products is further supported by the approach the federal courts employ when
applying the nonfunctionality and secondary meaning tests in determining whether trademark
rights exist in product configuration and trade dress sought to be federally registered. See In
re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1343 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (product configuration
registration case citing requirement that plaintiff satisfy nonfunctionality and distinctiveness tests);
Application of World's Finest Chocolate, Inc., 474 F.2d 1012, 1014 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (same);
see also infra notes 162-64 and accompanying text (discussing close relation of distinctiveness
and secondary meaning tests). Further, the likelihood of confusion test in §43(a) analyses for
product configurations and trade dress is similar to the test that federal courts use to determine
whether a defendant has infringed a registered trademark under §32 of the Lanham Act. See
Bauer, supra note 16, at 696 n.l17 (federal courts use likelihood of confusion test in both §32
registered mark infringement cases and §43(a) unregistered mark infringement cases to determine
whether trademark rights were infringed).
84. Compare Petersen Mfg. v. Central Purchasing, Inc., 740 F.2d 1541, 1549-50 (Fed.
Cir. 1984) (court first tested plalntiff's product configuration for secondary meaning and then
applied nonfunctionality test) with Sno-Wizard Mfg. v. Eisemann Prods. Co., 791 F.2d 423,
426-27 (5th Cir. 1986) (first applying nonfunctionality test and then applying secondary meaning
test).
85. See Bauer, supra note 16, at 671-72 (noting inconsistencies in federal courts' rulings
on §43(a) claims).
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involving the outward appearance of computer hardware components did little
to clarify section 43(a) applications.6 In Digital Equipment Corp. v. C. Itoh
& Co.,87 the District of New Jersey considered Digital Equipment Corpora-
tion's (DEC) claim that the outward appearance of DEC's VT220 computer
video monitor and keyboard unit, although unregistered, had achieved
trademark rights under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act." Defendants, the
C. Itoh Companies (C. Itoh), marketed a video terminal and accompanying
keyboard, called the CIT-220 +, that emulated products similar to those that
DEC manufactured.9
The DEC court distinguished between a primary market and a sec-
ondary market for computer hardware products. 90 Manufacturers such as
DEC who manufacture complete multi-user systems supply the "prime
market" for multi-user systems. 91 Manufacturers such as C.Itoh, who
manufacture additional terminals, keyboards and other DEC-emulating
equipment, supply a market that the DEC court termed the "after
market" for multi-user systems. 92 The separate after market exists because
computer systems users frequently wish to enlarge a system's capabilities
so that additional users simultaneously may use the original central
processing unit, or CPU. 93 To remain competitive, after market manu-
facturers must produce equipment that is operationally compatible with
the equipment of the prime market manufacturers. 94 C. Itoh based its
survival and success in the DEC products after market on the claim that
while functionally compatible with the DEC system, the CIT-220+ has
certain functional advantages over and features in addition to DEC's
VT220, and the further claim that the CIT-220+ is less expensive than
the DEC VT220. 95
In asserting its claim that C.Itoh copied DEC product features in
violation of section 43(a), DEC argued that C.Itoh went beyond the
boundaries of legal emulation and asserted that C. Itoh intentionally
copied the shape and layout of the video terminal and keyboard of the
DEC VT220 product line in manufacturing C. Itoh's CIT-220+ line of
components.16 DEC claimed that the CIT-220 + was an infringement with
86. See infra notes 88-212 and accompanying text (exploring problems that arise from
determination that configuration of computer video terminal and keyboard did not satisfy
requirements for §43(a) protection from competitor duplication).
87. No. 84-5317, slip op. (D.N.J. Sept. 20, 1985).
88. Id. at 2-15, 18-25.
89. Id. at 5 (C. Itoh products emulated DEC products in both appearance and function).
90. Id. at 4-5.
91. Id. at 3-5. (IBM indicated as another prime market manufacturer).
92. Id.; see supra note 1 and accompanying text (defining emulation as computer industry
term of art for legitimate product copying).
93. DEC, No. 84-5317, slip op. at 8, 20; see supra note 1 and accompanying test (defining
CPU).
94. Id. at 5.
95. Id. at 13.
96. Id. at 2. According to the findings of the court in Digital Equipment Corporation
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respect to all products in the DEC "family" of computer products that had
keyboard layouts and video terminal appearance identical or similar to the
VT220 9 7 Unlike earlier suits that attacked emulation of computer product
features solely on grounds of copyright infringement, DEC's action included
a trademark claim.98 DEC claimed that the C.Itoh terminals and key-
boards, which were virtually identical to the DEC terminals and key-
boards, infringed trademark rights that DEC had acquired in the
unregistered configuration of DEC's VT220 unit. 99 DEC asserted that
creation of product source recognition in the minds of purchasers required
a substantial financial investment in product design engineering and
advertising. 10 0
According to DEC, the alleged duplications caused or potentially
caused purchasers to mistake the C. Itoh products for DEC products.' 0'
DEC asserted that the duplication and corresponding purchaser confusion
established a violation of section 43(a). 02 DEC's theory was that section
v. C. Itoh & Company, the Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) competes in the multi-
user systems market. Id. at 4. In a multi-user system, two or more users access a single CPU
using separate video terminals and keyboards. Id.; see also supra note 1 and accompanying
text (defining central processing unit, or CPU). Multi-user systems differ from personal
computers in that in a traditional personal computer (or microcomputer) system, only one
terminal and keyboard may access a CPU at one time. See Helms, The McGraw-Hill Computer
Handbook, 25-1 to 25-4 (1983) (explaining components of microcomputer system). With the
advent of local area networks (LANs), which are in essence only a new variety of multi-user
system, personal computers now serve both as central CPUs for a multi-user system and also
as access terminals. A. SanmAN & I. FLoRs, supra note 1, at §III; see also Cooper and
Sapronov, Software Protection And Pricing In a LAN Environment, 5 CoMPUTER L. RP. 27,
27 (1986) (defining LANs and describing hardware components and functions of LANs). In
its action against C. Itoh, DEC thus had ample reason to seek trademark protection for its
personal computers as well as its VT220 terminals. See DEC, No. 84-5317, slip op. at 5
(indicating that DEC included two lines of personal computers in §43(a) claim against
C. Itoh).
97. Id. at 5. In Digital Equipment Corp. v. C. Itoh & Co., the allegedly infringed DEC
family of products included DEC's RAINBOW and DECMATE personal computers, accom-
modating one user per CPU, as well as the VT220 terminals and keyboards, which provide
multiple user access to a central CPU. Id.; see also supra note 96 and accompanying text
(explaining expanding roles of personal computers resulting from emergence of local area
networks, or LANs).
98. DEC, No. 84-5317, slip op. at 1; see supra note 2 and accompanying text (noting
extensive litigation of computer product copying claims under copyright theories). The plaintiff,
Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) asserted a copyright claim in DEC's action against
C. Itoh. DEC at I. The copyright claim, however, involved only a minor aspect of the disputed
emulation. Id. at 15-16. The DEC court dismissed the copyright claim because of deficiencies
in DEC's pleadings. Id. at 25. DEC's primary ground for complaint in the C. Itoh litigation
involved the Lanham Act §43(a) trademark claim concerning C. Itoh's exact duplication of
DEC product features. Id. at 2-25.
99. DEC, No. 84-5317, slip op. at 2-25..
100. Id. at 13; see supra note 4 and accompanying text (explaining product source
recognition, or consumer associations of certain product features with particular manufactur-
ers).
101. DEC, No. 84-5317, slip op. at 2.
102. Id. at 18.
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43(a), according to recent judicial interpretation, proscribes product du-
plications that cause confusion over product source. 103 DEC specifically
claimed section 43(a) trademark coverage for the overall appearance of
the face of the VT220 video display terminal, the layout of the typing
keys on the accompanying keyboard, and the shape and color of the
monitor and keyboard.10 4 DEC sought an order enjoining C. Itoh from
manufacturing, selling, distributing, and advertising the CIT-220+ video
terminal and keyboard.
0 5
In considering DEC's request for a preliminary injunction, the DEC
court performed a detailed analysis of DEC's section 43(a) claim. 06 The
DEC court applied each of the three section 43(a) tests of functionality,
secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion. 0 7 The DEC court held
that DEC failed to carry the burden of demonstrating that the key-
board layout and monitor appearance were nonfunctional, that the shape
and color of the keyboard and monitor had acquired secondary meaning,
and that buyers were likely to be confused with resepect to the origin
of the C.Itoh CIT-220 + .101 The DEC court therefore denied DEC's request
for a preliminary injunction. 109
In applying the non-functionality test, the DEC court determined that
DEC was unlikely to succeed in proving the nonfunctionality, in the
relevant after market for DEC-compatible peripherals, of the layout of
the keyboard keys and the face of the video monitor of the duplicated
VT220 unit."10 The DEC court noted that a variety of other useful designs
103. See id. at 18-22 (citing §43(a) case precedent favorable to DEC's §43(a) claim, but
finding precedent inapplicable).
104. Id. at 24.
105. Id. at 2.
106. Id. at 2-15, 17-22 and 24-25. The court in Digital Equipment Corp. v. C. Itoh & Co.
focused on whether DEC was likely to succeed in the final analysis with respect to the
permanent injunction. Id.
107. Id. at 24-25. See infra notes 108-96 and accompanying text (discussing DEC court's
applications of nonfunctionality, secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion tests); see
also supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text (explaining nonfunctionality test); supra notes
68-71 and accompanying text (explaining secondary meaning test); supra notes 72-76 and
accompanying text (explaining likelihood of confusion test).
108. DEC, No. 84-5317, slip op. at 24-25; see supra notes 87-109 and accompanying text
(discussing DEC court's analysis in concluding that DEC failed to carry requisite burdens in
the tests of nonfunctionality, secondary meaning, and likelihood of confusion).
109. DEC, No. 84-5317, slip op. at 24-25.
110. Id. at 24. In performing the nonfunctionality test, the court in Digital Equipment Corp.
v. C. Itoh & Co. individually analyzed various components of the VT220's outward appearance.
Id. at 8-12. Federal courts disagree with respect to whether the functionality test should apply
to the overall configuration or to the configuration's individual components. Compare id. at
7-15 (DEC court separately analyzing duplication of video monitor features and keyboard
features) with Industria Arredamenti Fratelli Saporiti v. Charles Craig, Ltd., 725 F.2d 18, 20
(2d Cir. 1984) (holding that in §43(a) product configuration analysis, courts are "mistake[n]
to break the design down into components" when plaintiff seeks protection for overall
appearance).
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were available for the keyboard and terminal."' The DEC court con-
cluded, however, that the exact configuration of the VT220 reflected
industry standards for the functional aspects of the VT220 unit. 1" 2 Ac-
cording to the court, recognizing industry standards for computer product
features and preventing any one manufacturer from obtaining exclusive
rights in the standards fosters effective competition in the after markets." 3
According to the DEC court, the industry standards benefit consumers
by facilitating comparability and interchangeability among the products
of various manufacturers. 14 Pursuant to the industry standards rationale,
evidence of industry standards militates against acceptance of evidence
of feasible design alternatives to satisfy the nonfunctionality test."- The
DEC court reasoned that the availability of alternative designs does not
indicate that the preferred standard, which is the copied design of the
original producer, is not functional." 6 The DEC court found that in order
for a user to transfer skills acquired through use of a DEC keyboard to
an emulator keyboard, the copy need not be identical to the DEC
keyboard, but must be as similar as possible to maximize operator
efficiency.' ' 7 The DEC court effectively held that the industry standards
may be copied freely." 8 According to the DEC court, the benefits that
consumers derive from the standards preclude trademark protection for
even precisely duplicated product features when the standards encompass
the duplicated features." 19
In holding that DEC was unlikely to show that the disputed DEC
product features were nonfunctional, the DEC court followed ample
precedent in circumventing an explanation of why the federal law under-
111. DEC, No. 84-5317, slip op. at 20.
112. Id. at 20.
113. Id. (quoting from and citing as controlling United States Golf Assn. v. St. Andrews
Sys., 749 F.2d 1028, 1034 (3d Cir. 1984)) In United States Golf Assn v. St. Andrews Systems,
the dispute was not over a duplicated product configuration, but rather over a mathematical
formula that the defendant's small computer used to compute golf handicaps. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that when products of different manufac-
turers serve as close substitutes for one another, the development of industry standards for
certain aspects of the products benefits consumers through comparability and interchangeability.
United States Golf Assn., 749 F.2d at 1034. The United States Gof Assn. court reasoned that
although other standards may be useful and feasible, the preferred, copied feature is not
necessarily nonfunctional Id. The United States Golf Assn. court concluded that allowing the
original manufacturer to obtain exclusive rights in a standard enables the original manufacturer
to prevent competition, thus defeating free competition policy. Id.; see supra note 1 and
accompanying text (discussing computer market practice of product emulation).
114. DEC, No. 84-5317, slip op., at 20.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 8.
118. Id. at 20 (citing United States Court of Appeals for Third Circuit in United States
Golf Assn. v. St. Andrews Sys., 749 F.2d 1028, 1034 (3d Cir. 1984), for proposition that
court must support free imitation of industry standards).
119. Id.
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lying section 43(a) allows federal patent policy, which provides for limited
duration monopolies, to override federal trademark policy, which provides
for infinite duration monopolies. 20 The federal circuit courts of appeal,
in deciding the issue of nonfunctionality in section 43(a) cases, never
explain fully the reason that patent coverage and trademark coverage are
mutually exclusive with respect to functional features. 121 In effect, the
courts allow the public interest in purchasing competitive products to
completely override producers' rights to protect product recognition and
consumers' rights to protection against misrepresentations of product
120. Id. at 19 (DEC court holding that societal interest in competition "outweighs"
usefulness of functional feature in identifying product source); see W. T. Rogers Co. v. Keene,
778 F.2d 334, 337-40 (7th Cir. 1985) (explaining policy and mechanics of nonfunctionality
doctrine, but failing to explain why free competition policy is allowed to override trademark
policy through use of nonfunctionality test); Fisher Stoves, Inc. v. All Nighter Stove Works,
Inc., 626 F.2d 193, 195-96 (1st Cir. 1980) (same). But see Note, supra note 7, at 84-89 (arguing
that in §43(a) watershed case of Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210,
1217-19. (8th Cir. 1976) cert. denied 429 U.S. 861 (1976), United States Court of Appeals for
Eighth Circuit rejected nonfunctionality doctrine). The commentator argued further that, in
general, the nonfunctionality test is completely inappropriate in §43(a) analyses because the
test allows one federal policy, free competition, to completely override another federal policy,
the trademark policy of avoidance of consumer confusion over product source. Id The
commentator notes that no rationale supports free competition policy's dominating position
in the nonfunctionality doctrine. Id.
121. See, e.g., W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 338 (7th Cir. 1985) (asserting
necessity of functionality test "to head off . . . collision between section 43(a) and patent
law"). In W. T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, the Seventh Circuit circumvented explanation of the
reason that nonfunctionaity is required. Id. The court addressed the argument of one
commentator that functional features deserve trademark protection to prevent consumer
confusion unless the protection unduly impedes competition. Id.; see Note, supra note 7, at
81-93 (commentary, that W. T. Rogers court addressed, arguing that only when competition is
unduly impeded should court refuse to grant trademark protection). The W.T. Rogers court
responded that the commentator's rationale overlooked the importance "of heading off a
collision between §43(a) and patent law." W.T. Rogers Co., 778 F.2d at 338. A patent-
trademark policy conflict does raise the difficult issue of reconciling conflicting federal laws,
but fails to explain why trademark policy should receive absolutely no weight in the nonfunc-
tionality analysis. See In re Morton-Norwich Prods., 671 F.2d 1332, 1336 (C.C.P.A. 1982)
(noting that no statute directly requires nonfunctionality for trademark protection, but rather
that courts have deduced requirement from limited duration of patents); Fisher Stoves, Inc.
v. All Nighter Stove Works, Inc., 626 F.2d 193, 195 (1st Cir. 1980) (asserting that consuming
public's interest in free competition and economic and technological progress supports allowing
competitors to copy with impunity unpatented functional features); see also supra note 120
and accompanying text (arguing for compromise between patent or free competition policy
and trademark policy); infra notes 122-125 and accompanying text (same).
In United States Golf Association v. St. Andrews Systems, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit did not cite the patent-trademark policy conflict but nevertheless
held that a functional feature does not warrant trademark protection because the social interest
in free competition outweighs the feature's usefulness in identifying a product's manufacturer.
United States Golf Assn., 749 F.2d 1028, 1033 (3d Cir. 1984). The United States Golf Assn.
opinion cites no judicial precedent or commentator concurrence to support the policy conclu-
sion. Id.; see supra note 113 and accompanying text (noting that DEC court considered United
States Golf Association controlling in DEC's dispute with C. Itoh over product duplication).
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origin. 22 Under patent law, the competing policies of innovation and free
competition are accommodated through a compromise in the form of a
time limit on patent protection.123 Under the nonfunctionality doctrine,
however, no similar compromise is attempted, with the result that the
doctrine completely subordinates trademark policy to free competition
policy. 124 In the balance of trademark policy against the policy of free
competition inherent in the nonfunctionality doctrine, trademark policy
has no weight. 12S
The lack of statutory response by Congress to counter the judicially
created functionality doctrine may lend support to the continuing appli-
cation of the doctrine. 26 Before relying on congressional inactivity to
justify continued application of the nonfunctionality doctrine, however,
the federal courts should note that Congress historically has acted at an
extremely slow pace in developing trademark policy. 27 Congressional
122. See DEC, No. 84-5317, slip op. at 19-20 (relying on Third Circuit's opinion in
United States Golf Association v. St. Andrews Systems for guidance in nonfunctionality test);
see also supra note 113 and accompanying text (noting DEC court's reliance on Third Circuit's
holding in United States Golf Assn. v. St. Andrews Sys., 749 F.2d 1028, 1034 (3d Cir. 1984)).
In United States Golf Association, the Third Circuit asserted that free competition is the
completely dominant policy and implicitly ignored the trademark policy of protection of
consumers and manufacturers from product identity confusion. United States Golf Assn., 749
F.2d at 1034.
One commentator states that a functional feature's capacity to serve as an identifier of
the product's manufacturer is "a lesser addition to societal resources" than the innovative
quality of a patentable feature. Bauer, supra note 16, at 717. According to the commentator,
the less societally important trademark characteristic should not enjoy the longer, infinite
protection of trademark law when compared with the more important, patentable innovation
that patent law protects for only seventeen years. Id. But see Note, supra note 7, at 78 & 81-
86 (arguing that public policy does support trademark protection for functional product
features that have attained capacity to serve as product manufacturer identifiers).
123. See Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §154 (1982) (providing seventeen-year limit on patent
duration).
124. Bauer, supra note 16, at 717. One commentator firmly advocates the continued
application of the nonfunctionality test on policy grounds. Id. at 716-28. The commentator
acknowledges the lack of compromise between patent and trademark policy. Id. at 717. The
commentator justifies the lack of compromise, however, on the basis that a trademark's
manufacturer identifying function is a "lesser addition to societal resources" than the benefits
of allowing innovation to enter the public domain through free imitation. Id. But see Note,
supra note 7, at 84-89 (arguing that trademark function of manufacturer identification is
sufficient benefit to societal interests to allow §43(a) protection for even functional features).
The commentator further concedes that courts should not limit their consideration to a
choice between two polar alternatives - a determination that a mark is either an indication
of source or an important ingredient in the commercial success of the product. Bauer, supra
note 16, at 723. The commentary, however, provides no explanation of a workable alternative
to avoid the polarization asserted to be undesirable. Id.
125. See supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text (demonstrating that no weight is
given to trademark policy in balance of competing policies of free competition and trademark
protection).
126. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (text of §43(a) contains no reference,
explicit or implicit, to nonfunctionality test).
127. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (noting that Congress deliberated trademark
policy for two decades before enacting 1946 Lanham Act).
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consideration of bills culminating in the Lanham Act spanned two dec-
ades .128
Several of the same courts that have applied the nonfunctionality
doctrine without fully explaining the doctrine's legitimacy have con-
structed nonfunctionality tests that tend to mitigate the doctrine's harsh
impact on trademark policy. 129 The courts accomplish mitigation of the
doctrine's harsh impact by applying functionality standards that favor
findings of nonfunctionality. 30 In W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene,", the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit applied a practical
approach to the nonfunctionality test.1 32 The W.T. Rogers court consid-
ered whether an exact duplicate of the configuration of molded, stacked
office trays was indispensible to a competitor in order to compete effec-
tively.1 33 The W.T. Rogers court reasoned that if effective competition
was possible without exact duplication of the disputed features, then the
features were nonfunctional. 134 One factor on which the W.T. Rogers
court relied heavily was the cost that the competitor must incur to dispense
with the functional feature.135 Because the W. T. Rogers court determined
that the trial court's jury instructions on nonfunctionality were erroneous,
the Seventh Circuit remanded the case to the trial court to include a
128. Id.
129. Compare supra note 121 and accompanying text (citing opinions of federal circuit
courts of appeal that applied nonfunctionality test without addressing policy conflict inherent
in nonfunctionality doctrine) with infra notes 130-34 and accompanying text (noting that same
federal courts have fashioned nonfunctionality standards that facilitate plaintiff demonstrations
of nonfunctionality).
130. See W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 339, 342-43 & 346 (7th Cir. 1985)
(Seventh Circuit applying nonfunctionality standard pursuant to which plaintiff can easily show
nonfunctionality); see also infra notes 131-34 and accompanying text (discussing Seventh
Circuit's approach to nonfunctionality test).
131. 778 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1985).
132. See W. T. Rogers Co., 778 F.2d at 339, 342-43 & 346 (court holding that functionality
exists in original configuration only where exact duplication of original configuration is
indispensible to effective competition).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 343.
135. Id. at 339-40; see Inwood Laboratories v. Ives Laboratories, 456 U.S. 844, 850-51
(1982). The United States Supreme Court has never ruled expressly on the proper standards
of the nonfunctionality test. Inwood Laboratories, 456 U.S. at 850-51. Citing the 1964 decision
in Sears, Roebuck & Company v. Stiffel Company, the Supreme Court in Inwood Laboratories
v. Ives Laboratories explained, in a collateral analysis, that a product feature is functional
only if essential to the utility of the product or if the feature affects the cost of the product.
Id. at 850-51 n.10. Although not as favorable to §43(a) plaintiffs as the Seventh Circuit's
indispensability standard, the Supreme Court's observation promotes a policy balance that
bars the total nullification of trademark policy that occurred in the DEC court's nonfunction-
ality analysis. See DEC, No. 84-5317, slip op. at 5-11, 19-21 (D.N.J. Sept. 20, 1985) (citing
free competition policy and giving no weight to trademark policy in application of nonfunc-
tionality test); see also W.T. Rogers Co., 778 F.2d at 339-46 (explaining Seventh Circuit's
indispensability standard in nonfunctionality test application).
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discussion of indispensability in the jury instructions on nonfunctional-
ity.
136
The DEC court properly could have used the W.T. Rogers court's
practical indispensability rationale to find trademark rights in DEC's
keyboard and terminal design. 137 As the DEC court noted, emulation of
DEC video products is a multi-billion dollar industry.138 Numerous com-
petitors effectively compete with DEC's VT220 system without precise
duplication of DEC product appearance. 39 The DEC court specifically
found that no other VT220 emulator on the market replicated the DEC
design as closely as the CIT-220+ .40 Precise duplication of DEC product
appearance, therefore, is not indispensible to effective competition under
the Seventh Circuit standards in W.T. Rogers.14' Successful emulation,
as the DEC court noted, requires only that the emulators' products
perform substantially like DEC products. 42 Under a W.T. Rogers analysis,
the DEC court properly could have ruled that because exact duplication
of DEC product features was not indispensible to successful emulation,
the features' precise appearance was nonfunctional. 43 Federal courts
invoking the nonfunctionality doctrine to allow exact duplication as an
element of product emulation, and thus denying trademark protection for
the product configuration, further unfair competition at the cost of
consumer deception and the original manufacturer's market goodwill.'
44
The United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, in address-
ing federal registration of product configurations, has also perceived a
need to strike a balance between the competitors' right to copy and manu-
facturers' and the public's right to the protection of product source identifi-
cations.' 4 1 Conceptually, no difference exists between the nonfunctionality
136. W.T. Rogers Co., 778 F.2d at 348.
137. See infra notes 137-44 and accompanying text (explaining potential for application
of Seventh Circuit's indispensability standard to facts of DEC dispute).
138. DEC, No. 84-5317, slip op. at 5.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 11.
141. Id. (noting that numerous other successful manufacturers of DEC emulating products
do not precisely duplicate DEC configuration features); see supra notes 130-34 and accom-
panying text (explaining Seventh Circuit's indispensability standard in nonfunctionality test
application).
142. DEC, No. 84-5317, slip op. at 11.
143. See supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text (explaining Seventh Circuit's indis-
pensability test for nonfunctionality of product features).
144. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text (explaining trademark goals of
protecting manufacturers and consumers from confusion in marketplace over product origin).
One commentator noted that competition must be fair to be free. Oddi, supra note 7, at 926.
Promoting free competition while ignoring trademark policy would result in free but unfair
competition. See id. (noting that Congress created trademark law to ensure fairness in
competitive economy). See generally Note, supra note 7, at 84-90 (arguing that functionality
test that assigns all weight to patent policy and no weight to trademark policy has no place
in trademark law).
145. See In re Morton-Norwich Prods., 671 F.2d 1332, 1340 (C.C.P.A. 1982 (noting
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tests for product configuration registration and section 43(a) pro-
tection for unregistered product configurations. 46 The Court of Cus-
toms and Patent Appeals' functionality philosophy is virtually the same
as the functionality philosophy of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit as expressed in W. T. Rogers. 47 According to the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, the underlying public policy of
the nonfunctionality doctrine is not a right to duplicate any feature lacking
patent protection, - but the need to copy features in order to compete
effectively. 148 In In re Morton-Norwich Products, the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals held that the existence of available alternatives to the
duplicated feature is a factor in favor of the granting of trademark
protection. 49 According to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals'
rationale, an emulator cannot duplicate exactly a preferred alternative
unless the exact duplication is indispensible to effective competition. 150
desirability of fostering competition but holding that configuration of spray bottle could be
registered on federal trademark register).
146. See LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 76-80 (2d Cir. 1985) (granting
§43(a) trademark protection to the unregistered outward appearance of a shoulder bag). The
Second Circuit in LeSportsac v. K Mart Corporation, noting that nonfunctionality considera-
tions were the same in both registered and unregistered product configuration actions, followed
a Court of Customs and Patent Appeals ruling on functionality in a registration action. Id.
Similarly, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, noting the overlap of the nonfunctionality
doctrine in registered and unregistered product configuration cases, cited with approval a ruling
on nonfunctionality in a §43(a) unregistered product configuration action by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. See In re Morton-Norwich Prods., 671 F.2d 1332,
1339 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (citing Truck Equipment Service Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210,
1218 (8th Cir. 1976)).
147. See In Re Morton-Norwich Prods., 671 F.2d 1332, 1339 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (suggesting
standard for nonfunctionality test similar to indispensability standard of Seventh Circuit in
W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 339 & 342 (7th Cir. 1985)); see also supra note
130-34 and accompanying text (discussing indispensability standard that W.T. Rogers court
employed in applying nonfunctionality test to §43(a) claim).
148. In Re Morton-Norwich Prods., 671 F.2d at 1339.
149. Id. at 1341.
150. Id.; see Application of Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925, 932-33 (C.C.P.A.
1964) (Rich, J., concurring). In Application of Mogen David Wine Corp., Judge Rich argued
that the test of nonfunctionality is whether the feature is "in essence" functional. Application
of Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d at 932-33. Judge Rich distinguished product and trade
dress features that are -only incidentally functional. Id. According to Judge Rich, a finding of
mere incidental functionality does not preclude trademark protection for the incidentally
functional features. Id. Judge Rich argued that the law does not recognize a public right to
copy incidentally functional features when the original manufacturer arbitrarily chose the design
of the features. Id. (quoting majority in Application of Deister Concentrator Company, 289
F.2d 496, 498 (C.C.P.A. 1961)). Judge Rich, in his Mogen David concurrence, laid the
groundwork for the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals' later philosophy regarding the
nonfunctionality test. See In Re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1339-41
(C.C.P.A. 1982) (Judge Rich writing for majority and incorporating his arguments in Mogen
David concurrence into majority opinion).
Arbitrariness of the design of the plaintiff's product was a consideration, although not a
controlling factor, in Digital Equipment Corp. v. C. Itoh & Co., (DEC), No. 84-5317, slip
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Thus, whether a computer manufacturer seeks protection for unregistered pro-
duct configurations or trade dress under section 43(a) or through federal
trademark registration, courts should grant trademark policy due weight in
the functionality analysis.'
In addition to determining whether the DEC product features were
functional, the DEC court considered whether DEC had shown that the
duplicated products had acquired secondary meaning in the marketplace. 1
52
Similar to its application of the nonfunctionality test, the DEC court
imposed on DEC relatively high standards for showing that the appearance
of the VT220 system had achieved secondary meaning.' DEC offered as
evidence the results of a survey by a market research expert of ninety-
seven recent purchasers of VT220 systems. 5 4 Forty-four of the ninety-
seven participants indicated DEC as the manufacturer of C. Itoh's CIT-
220 + system while only four participants correctly indicated C. Itoh. 15
The expert concluded from the survey results that DEC had developed
secondary meaning in the shape and configuration of the VT220 prod-
ucts. 5 6 Despite the tendency of the survey to show that nearly half of
the participants associated DEC with the appearance of the C. Itoh
system, the DEC court considered the survey results unpersuasive and
op. at 8, 24-25 (D.N.J. Sept. 20, 1985) (finding that DEC's product was arbitrarily designed
but refusing to grant §43(a) protection). The DEC court noted that DEC engineers arbitrarily
selected the layout of the VT220 keyboard. Id. at 8. The DEC court additionally found that
the keyboard layout was not initially functional but had become functional over time in the
relevant after market. Id. at 14. Applying the philosophy of the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals, the functionality of the DEC keyboard layout would be at most incidentally functional.
See id. at 8 (DEC court finding that DEC arbitrarily selected features of VT220 keyboard).
The DEC court nevertheless ruled that the keyboard layout was functional, thus barring
trademark protection. Id. at 24. The DEC court further found that other manufacturers
emulated the VT220 keyboards with only similar, not precisely replicated, key arrangements.
Id. at 8.
151. See supra notes 130-50 and accompanying text (indicating that indispensability
applies in both registration and nonregistration situations).
152. DEC, No. 84-5317, slip op. at 13-14.
153. See id. at 13-14 & 24 (application of secondary meaning test). The District of New
Jersey in DEC found unpersuasive the results of a DEC susvey that tended to show the
existence of secondary meaning. Id. The DEC court also refused to allow DEC's showing of
product configuration distinctiveness, based on substantial DEC investment in advertising and
product design, to suffice for purposes of the secondary meaning test. Id. at 13.
154. Id. at 14. In the secondary meaning survey discussed in DEC, DEC researchers
showed photographs of four VT220 emulators, with maker identifications masked, to ninety-
seven survey participants. Id. The photographs depicted each of the four emulators at the
same angle and distance and under the same lighting. Id. The photographs did not include a
VT220. Id. Participants indicated their beliefs with respect to the identity of the manufacturer
that produced each of the emulators shown. Id; see also infra notes 155-57 and accompanying
text (discussing DEC's secondary meaning survey).
155. DEC, No. 84-5317, slip op. at 14. The forty-nine participants in the secondary
meaning survey discussed in DEC who did not indicate DEC as the producer of the CIT-
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held that the survey had not fulfilled the burden of showing secondary
meaning in the shape and color of the keyboard and monitor. 57 DEC
also sought to demonstrate that DEC had created a potential for secondary
meaning through the significant investment made in promoting the dis-
tinctive look of the VT220 monitor and keyboard.' The DEC court,
however, insisted that DEC show actual secondary meaning and not
merely a potential for secondary meaning.159 The DEC court therefore
held that DEC failed to show that the shape and color of DEC's keyboard
and video monitor had acquired secondary meaning in the minds of pur-
chasers.'60
Federal circuit courts of appeal generally consider the secondary
meaning test to be a mandatory element of all section 43(a) analyses.'
6'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, which is the successor to the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals, have held, however, that a section 43(a) plaintiff need not prove
actual secondary meaing in order to receive trademark protection if the plain-
tiff can show that its product is inherently distinctive. 162 Because the purpose
157. Id. at 14, 24; cf. Sno-Wizard Mfg. v. Eisemann Prods., 791 F.2d 423, 427 (5th
Cir. 1986) (consideration of secondary meaning survey evidence in §43(a) action). In Sno-
Wizard Manufacturing Corp. v. Eisemann Products, Inc., the Fifth Circuit first held that
survey evidence was the best indicia of secondary meaning and then held that the plaintiff's
extensive survey evidence was unpersuasive. Sno- Wizard Mfg., 791 F.2d at 427 (finding flaw
in logic of surveying 83 current users of emulated product who, arguably, were sensitive to
subtle distinctions in competing products).
158. DEC, No. 84-5317, slip op. at 13.
159. Id. at 24.
160. Id. at 14, 24.
161. See Litton Sys. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1444-45 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (noting
mandatory application of secondary meaning test in §43(a) actions); Truck Equip. Serv. Co.
v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1215 (8th Cir. 1976) (noting mandatory nature of secondary
meaning test in §43(a) actions and asserting that test is in conformity with congressional
purpose underlying §43(a)) cert. denied 429 U.S. 861 (1976); see also Bauer, supra note 16, at
712 (noting "universal requirement of proof of secondary meaning").
162. See Sno-Wizard Mfg. v. Eisemann Prods., 791 F.2d 423, 425 n.2 (5th Cir. 1986)
(holding that product feature's distinctiveness satisfies secondary meaning test in §43(a) product
configuration analysis); In Re Morton-Norwich Prods., 671 F.2d 1332, 1342 (C.C.P.A. 1982)
(holding that in order to register product configuration plaintiff must demonstrate that design
functions as indication of source, whether only inherently, because of distinctiveness, or
through actual secondary meaning); Petersen Mfg. v. Central Purchasing, Inc., 740 F.2d 1541,
1549 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that distinctiveness suffices to satisfy secondary meaning test
in §43(a) product configuration analysis).
A variation on the distinctiveness argument is the holding of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York in Metro Kane Imports, Ltd. v. Federated
Department Stores, Inc. See Metro Kane Imports, Ltd. v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 625
F.Supp. 313, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that potential secondary meaning satisfies secondary
meaning test) aff'd sub nom. Metro Kane v. Brookstone Co., 800 F.2d 1128 (2d Cir. 1986).
In Metro Kane, the district court agreed with the plaintiff that a showing of potential secondary
meaning suffices for the secondary meaning requirement under § 43(a). Id. Conceptually, distinc-
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of trademark coverage is to protect manufacturers and the public from con-
sumer confusion, the less stringent standard of inherent distinctiveness that
the Fifth and Federal Circuits and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
applied suffices to promote trademark policy."6 3 As the Fifth Circuit noted, the
potential for consumer confusion can exist when either the association
between a product feature and a particular manufacturer already exists
in consumers' minds or when the association potentially exists in con-
sumers' minds. 64
Given the rapid emergence of computer products in consumer markets,
very few computer products are likely to have developed substantial
secondary meaning. 65 If the federal courts adopt the DEC court's insist-
ence on showing actual secondary meaning, computer manufacturers and
the public will suffer significant confusion with respect to product iden-
tity. 66 The manufacturers' only recourse will be to attempt to register
product configurations under the less stringent standards of the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals, which allow mere distinctiveness as a basis
for trademark protection under the registration system. 67 To comply with
the policies of the trademark statute, the federal courts should favor
tiveness and potential secondary meaning are the same because both distinctiveness and potential
secondary meaning can give rise to a likelihood of confusion in the minds of consumers,
should a competitor identically duplicate the product feature.
163. See supra note 162 and accompanying text (describing standards employed by Fifth
Circuit and Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in secondary meaning tests); see also
M. Kramer Mfg. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 449 (4th Cir. 1986) (following philosophy of Fifth
Circuit and Court of Customs and Patent Appeals by applying easily satisfied secondary
meaning standards in §43(a) action). In M. Kramer Mfg. v. Andrews, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit applied an easily satisfied secondary meaning standard in a
trade dress duplication action. M. Kramer Mfg., 783 F.2d at 449. Although the language of
the Fourth Circuit did not allow mere distinctiveness to suffice for purposes of the secondary
meaning test, the standard that the court asserted implied a mere distinctiveness standard. Id.
According to the Fourth Circuit, the public need not be able to identify the name of a
product's manufacturer. Id. All that the plaintiff must show is that the public perceives that
a product emanates from a single source. Id. The M. Kramer Mfg. court noted in a footnote
the Fifth Circuit's willingness to allow a showing of distinctiveness to suffice for purposes of
the secondary meaning test. Id. at 449 n.26 (citing Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing
Groups, 659 F.2d 695, 702-03 (5th Cir. 1981) cert. denied 457 U.S. 1126 (1982) for proposition
that showing of distinctiveness satisfies test for secondary meaning); see Bauer, supra note 16,
at 708-16 (arguing that mere distinctiveness suffices for purposes of secondary meaning test).
164. See Sno-Wizard Mfg. v. Eisemann Prods., 791 F.2d 423, 425 n.2 (5th Cir. 1986)
(noting that both distinctiveness and secondary meaning can give rise to likelihood of confusion
in consumer minds).
165. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing rapid movement of computer
products into consumer markets).
166. See supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text (describing DEC's market survey
that strongly indicated actual existence of consumer confusion over source of C. Itoh product);
supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text (describing Lanham Act policy of preventing consumer
confusion over product source).
167. See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text (Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals allowed mere distinctiveness to suffice for purposes of secondary meaning standard).
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section 43(a) trademark protection for product attributes that may give
rise to a likelihood of consumer confusion. 168
In addition to addressing nonfunctionality and secondary meaning,
the DEC court considered whether DEC had shown a likelihood of
confusion between the VT220 and the CIT-220 + .169 The DEC court noted
that the C. Itoh unit was clearly labeled "CIT-220+" and the DEC unit
was clearly labeled "Digital VT220.' ' 70 On the bases of clear labeling,
the relatively high cost of the goods involved, the relative sophistication
of the purchasers, and the defendant's sales methods that aimed at
differentiating the two products, the DEC court held that DEC failed to
show a likelihood of confusion between the VT220 and the CIT-220+ . 71
The DEC court did not bring into the analysis of the likelihood of
confusion its finding that C. Itoh intended to produce a virtually identical
duplication of the appearance of the DEC VT220.172
A mere similarity between products will not satisfy the likelihood of
confusion test. 173 Various federal courts have set forth factors significant
in the likelihood of confusion analysis, including distinctiveness of the
plaintiff's mark, similarities between the competing marks and products,
similarities in geographical areas of concurrent use, existence of clear and
distinctive labeling, similarities in advertising methods, and marketing
channels.174 Federal courts also consider the defendant's intent to create
an exact duplication, proof of actual confusion, product cost, sophisti-
168. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text (discussing Lanham Act's dual policies
of protecting manufacturers' product recognition and protecting consumers from mistake and
deception with respect to product source of origin); infra notes 217-20 and accompanying text
(arguing that manufacturer generally should not bear heavy burden in obtaining trademark
protection).
169. DEC, No. 84-5317, slip op. at 15. In §43(a) actions, federal courts generally refuse
to provide relief when the plaintiff is unable to show that consumers are likely to confuse the
defendant's product with the plaintiff's similar product. See supra note 60 and accompanying
text (noting that likelihood of confusion is one of three recognized tests in applying §43(a)
that plaintiff must satisfy in order to prevail); infra notes 197-212 and accompanying text
(discussion of likelihood of confusion test in context of personal computer products).
170. DEC, No. 84-5317, slip op. at 12.
171. Id. at 12, 25.
172. Id. at 11 & 25. Contra LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 80 (2d Cir.
1985). The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in LeSportsac, Inc. v. K
Mart Corp., noted that the defendant intentionally replicated the exact appearance of plaintiff's
product and took steps to mitigate consumer confusion only after the plaintiff began litigating
the §43(a) infringement claim. LeSportsac Inc., 754 F.2d at 80. Further, many federal circuit
courts of appeal consider a defendant's intent to create a precise duplication to be a factor
supporting the plaintiff's claim of likelihood of confusion. See infra notes 174-75 and
accompanying text (setting forth list of factors, including defendant's intent, that federal courts
address in likelihood of confusion test).
173. Litton Sys. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
174. See, e.g., Sno-Wizard Mfg. v. Eisemann Prods., 791 F.2d 423, 428 (5th Cir. 1986)
(listing numerous factors that can be considered in likelihood of confusion analysis); Kwic-
Site Corp. v. Clear View Mfg., 758 F.2d 167, 178 (6th Cir. 1985) (same); Litton Sys. v.
Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d. 1423, 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (same).
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cation of likely purchasers, degree of care consumers are likely to take
in selecting the product, and fame of the prior mark. 7 - The federal
circuits and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals are divided with
respect to the factors that trial courts must address in a likelihood of
confusion analysis. 76 The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in 1973
in Application of Dupont 77 argued that trial courts must address each of
thirteen specified factors in the analysis. 7 8 In contrast, the Eleventh
Circuit in University of Georgia Athletic Association v. Laite,79 held two
factors to be dispositive and implied that even one factor may prove
dispositive.'80 The Sixth Circuit in Kwic-Site Corp. v. Clear View Man-
ufacturing Co.'8' and the Federal Circuit in Litton Systems v. Whirlpool
Corp.82 were in agreement that one particular factor was dispositive.
8 3
According to the Kwic-Site and Litton Systems courts, the most common
and effective means of displaying product source is clear labeling.8 4 When
175. See e.g., Sno-Wizard Mfg. v. Eisemann Prods., 791 F.2d 423, 428 (5th Cir. 1986)
(listing numerous factors that can be considered in likelihood of confusion analysis); Kwic-
Site Corp. v. Clear View Mfg., 758 F.2d 167, 178 (6th Cir. 1985) (same); Litton Sys. v.
Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d. 1423, 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (same).
176. See infra notes 172-85 and accompanying text (discussing dissention among federal
courts with respect to factors necessary in likelihood of confusion phase of §43(a) analysis).
In addition to dissention over the necessary factors in the likelihood of confusion tests,
dissention also exists among the federal circuits with respect to whether the determination of
likelihood of confusion is a question of law or fact. See Litton Sys. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728
F.2d 1423, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (noting dissention among federal courts over whether issue
of likelihood of confusion is question of law or fact). For example, the Eighth Circuit considers
the likelihood of confusion test to be a question of fact. See Prufrock Ltd., Inc. v. Lasater,
781 F.2d 129, 133 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that likelihood of confusion test is issue of fact
only to be overturned on appeal if clearly erroneous). The Federal Circuit, on the other hand,
considers the likelihood of confusion to be the ultimate question of law open to full
reconsideration on appeal. See Litton Systems, 728 F.2d at 1445 (disagreeing with Eighth
Circuit's holding in SquirtCo v. Seven-Up, 628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980) that likelihood
of confusion is question of fact). The Sixth Circuit considers the likelihood of confusion test
to be a mixed question of law and fact. Kwik-Site Corp. v. Clear View Mfg., 758 F.2d 167,
178 (6th Cir. 1985). The Sixth Circuit has ruled that the trial court's findings on the various
factors of the likelihood of confusion test are an issue of fact. Id. The Sixth Circuit, however,
considers the ultimate question of law to be the weighing of the various factors and consequent
holding regarding the likelihood of confusion. Id.
177. 476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
178. Application of Dupont, 476 F.2d at 1361.
179. 756 F.2d 1535 (11th Cir. 1985).
180. Laite, 756 F.2d at 1543. In University of Ga. Athletic Ass'n v. Laite, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the factors of similarity of the
competing designs and the defendant's intent to create an exact duplication were dispositive
in the likelihood of confusion test. Id.
181. 758 F.2d 167, (6th Cir. 1985).
182. 728 F.2d 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
183. Kwik-Site Corp., 758 F.2d at 178 (citing Litton Systems, 728 F.2d at 1446 for
proposition that one factor, clear and prominent labeling, can be dispositive in likelihood of
confusion test).
184. See Kwik-Site Corp. v. Clear View Mfg., 758 F.2d 167, 178, (6th Cir. 1985) (holding
that showing of clear labeling is dispositive in likelihood of confusion test); Litton Systems
Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (same).
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clear labeling appears, no likelihood of confusion is possible." 5
The DEC court, noting product cost, consumer sophistication, sales
methods, and clear labeling addressed four of the recognized factors in
determining the likelihood of confusion.' 8 6 The federal circuit courts have
singled out two of the factors that the DEC court addressed, clear labeling
and consumer sophistication, as having particular significance. 81 7 For
example, the Kwic-Site Corporation and Litton Systems courts held that
clear and distinctive labeling was a significant mitigator of consumer
confusion.' The Ninth Circuit in Shakey's Inc. v. Covalt8 9 stated that
trial courts should approach the likelihood of confusion inquiry from the
perspective of the applicable marketplace. 90 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit
noted in Sno- Wizard Manufacturing v. Eisemann Products Co.' 9, that a
significant consideration is the degree of care that purchasers are likely
to exercise, and whether the products involved are impulse-purchase items.'92
Although certain federal circuits note that the affixation of labeling
on the duplicated products alone may eliminate the potential for confu-
sion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit cautioned
against an absolute application of the labeling defense. 93 In Litton Sys-
tems, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that the legal effect of labeling
185. See Kwik-Site Corp. v. Clear View Mfg., 758 F.2d 167, 178, (6th Cir. 1985)
(defendant's proof of clear labeling defeated plaintiff's §43(a) claim for failure to prove likelihood
of confusion); Litton Systems Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(same).
186. DEC, No. 84-5317, slip op. at 12 & 25 (D.N.J. Sept. 20, 1985). See infra notes
187-212 and accompanying text (discussing factors that DEC court addressed in analyzing
likelihood of confusion).
187. See Sno-Wizard Mfg. v. Eisemann Prods., 791 F.2d 423, 429 (5th Cir. 1986)'
(emphasizing consumer sophistication and degree of care consumer is likely to exercise in
choosing purchase item and noting that confusion is more likely if purchases are impulse
items); Kwic-Site Corp. v. Clear View Mfg., 758 F.2d 167, 178 (6th Cir. 1985) (emphasizing
clear labeling as factor significantly mitigating likelihood of confusion); Litton Sys. v. Whirlpool
Corp.,728 F.2d 1423, 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (same); Shakey's Inc. v. Covalt, 704 F.2d 426,
431 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating that likelihood of confusion inquiry must be approached from
perspective of marketplace).
188. See Kwic-Site Corp. v. Clear View Mfg., 758 F.2d 167, 178 (6th Cir. 1985) (showing
of clear labeling is dispositive in likelihood of confusion test); Litton Sys. v. Whirlpool Corp.,
728 F.2d 1423, 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (same); See also supra note 183 and accompanying text
(noting Sixth Circuit and Federal Circuit emphasis on clear labeling as mitigator of likelihood
of confusion).
189. 704 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1983).
190. Shakey's, 704 F.2d at 431.
191. 791 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1986).
192. Sno-Wizard Mfg., 791 F.2d at 429 n.6; see supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text
(discussing circumstances underlying §43(a) claim in Sno-Wizard).
193. See Litton Sys. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (ruling
that labeling must be "clear" to defeat otherwise probable consumer confusion from product
duplication); see also infra note 194 and accompanying text (noting Litton Systems court's
comments on clear labeling).
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depends on both the prominence of the label and on the type of product. 194
Similarly, in LeSportsac Inc. v. K Mart Corp. 195, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that labels that are easily separated
from the product or trade dress are ineffective to eliminate the likelihood
of confusion.
96
The cautions of the Litton Systems and LeSportsac courts illustrate
that federal courts must be careful in addressing the defense of clear
labeling. 197 The DEC court failed to exercise the requisite care. 9s The
DEC court determined that C.Itoh's labeling of a video terminal and
keyboard unit with "CIT-220 +" adequately distinguished the CIT-220 +
from DEC's unit labeled "Digital VT220."' 9 The DEC court's determi-
nation that the two names adequately distinguish the products ignores the
fact that acronyms now dominate the computer industry. 20" Consequently,
the federal courts should not allow the slight distinctions between pro-
duct names such as "VT220" and "CIT-220 +" to offset other confusing
similarities in product configurations.2"' The federal courts must also address
carefully the factor of consumer sophistication and degree of care exercised
in the purchase decision to determine the exact market that includes the
disputed computer product.2"2 All personal and desktop computers have
similar overall appearances, consisting of a box containing the CPU, a
terminal and a keyboard. 0 3 The courts should note, however, whether a
duplicated personal computer product is a powerful business or scientific
device, or whether the product is designed of home users, including
children.21 4 Scientific and business users may exercise extensive care in
194. Litton Systems, 728 F.2d at 1446.
195. 754 F.2d 71, 80 (2d Cir. 1985).
196. Id. at 80; cf. Freixenet, S.A. v. Admiral Wine and Liquor Co., 731 F.2d 148, 151
(3d Cir. 1984) (finding no likelihood of confusion between competitors' wine bottles with
strikingly different labels that were unlikely to become separated from bottles).
197. See supra notes 193-96 and accompanying text (discussing problems in following
absolute rule that clear labeling negates likelihood of confusion).
198. See infra notes 199-206 and accompanying text (discussing confusing similarities in
DEC's and C.Itoh's product labeling that DEC court overlooked in finding that labeling of
competing products mitigated likelihood of confusion).
199. DEC, No. 84-5317, slip op. at 12.
200. See Williams & Welch, supra note 9, at 199-207 (illustrating multitude of acronyms
in computer industry). The leading computer companies in the United States, including IBM,
AT&T and DEC are commonly referred to by acronyms, or have actually taken on as formal
corporate names the acronyms of their former extended names. Id.
201. See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text (describing market survey results
indicating that significant number of consumers were confused with respect to source of
C. Itoh's CIT-200+ unit when shown photographs of unit with labeling masked).
202. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing demographics of computer
markets of 1980s with spectrum of buyer sophistication ranging from children to highly skilled
scientific users).
203. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing fundamental components of
small computer systems).
204. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (noting range of computer product
sophistication).
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purchasing a personal computer, while children may influence the home per-
sonal computer purchase." 5 When children influence the purchase decision,
the purchase tends to fall in the category of impulse buying, which is con-
sumer behavior that warrant significant trademark protection.
0 6
The DEC case primarily involved units of a multi-user system. 20 7 The
DEC court noted, however, that DEC designed its personal computer line
with design features similar to the VT220 multi-user terminals. 208 As the
DEC court observed, users of the VT220 might want to purchase DEC
emulators with virtually identical operational features for an easy tran-
sition of user skills. 20 9 Confusion would likely result if, for instance, an
office user of the VT220 desires to purchase a DEC or DEC-emulating
personal computer for home use, and as a consumer in a computer retail
outlet, views a DEC emulator and determines that the emulator, bear-
ing an acronym similar to that of the emulated DEC unit, is a DEC
unit. 210 Assuming that the retailer makes no effort to correct the mistake,
both the consumer and DEC will have suffered from the lack of trademark
protection. 21' Accordingly, the DEC court's finding of a high level of
consumer sophistication with respect to all DEC products may prove
short-sighted.
212
In the aftermath of DEC, one commentator has suggested that com-
puter products manufacturers should bear the primary burden of
establishing and protecting trademark rights in computer product config-
urations. 21 3 The commentator suggests that manufacturers should select
computer configuration features that are distinctive and arbitrary.214 Ac-
cording to the commentator, the features should contribute little to the
functional characteristics of the product.2 1 1 In addition, manufacturers'
advertising campaigns should emphsize the trademark aspects of the features
for which the manufacturer seeks protection.
2 1 6
205. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (noting range of sophistication of buyers
of computer products).
206. See supra note 187 and accompanying text (discussing judicial recognition of need
for greater trademark protection for products that consumers are likely to purchase on impulse).
207. See DEC, No. 84-5317, slip op. at 4 (discussing multi-user computer systems).
208. Id. at 5-6.
209. Id. at 8; see supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing home computer users'
inclination to prefer easy transition of user skills from office to home computers); supra note
113 and accompanying text (DEC court's observation that ease of transition from prime
market product to after market product is significant factor in success of emulator products).
210. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing vast computer retail market
system of 1980s).
211. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text (primary policy of Lanham Act is
protection of both consumers and manufacturers from product source confusion).
212. See DEC, No. 84-5317, slip op. at 25 (finding high level of buyer sophistication
without addressing impact of duplication on home or other nonbusiness users).




COMPUTER HARD WARE CONFIGURATIONS
A requirement that manufacturers bear the primary burden for un-
registered trademark protection, however, forces computer manufacturers
to treat legal defense strategies as a principal factor in the entrepreneurial
challenge. 2 7 Trademark considerations should not force manufacturers to
spend inordinate amounts of time and money in setting up legal protection
against unfair competition. 28 Trademark protection exists to serve the
legitimate interests of consumers and manufacturers. 21 9 Trademark law,
however, fails to serve consumers and manufacturers when trademark
considerations control significant business decisions such as product design
and marketing strategy.
220
In refusing DEC's section 43(a) trademark protection claim, the DEC
court denigrates the legitimate trademark interests of manufacturers and
consumers .221 The facts in DEC demonstrate that some functionality exists
217. See DEC, No. 84-5317, slip op. at 13-14, 24-25 (noting DEC's failure to gain
trademark protection for VT220 unit's appearance notwithstanding great magnitude of DEC's
expenditures to create a distinctive appearance for VT220 unit). In Digital Equipment Cor-
poration v. C. Itoh & Company, the Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) asserted that it
spent approximately $50 million promoting DEC's personal computer and VT220 product
lines. Id. at 13. Further, DEC presented evidence tending to show that DEC had earned
product recognition in minds of computer purchasers. Id. at 14. Nevertheless, DEC failed to
obtain trademark protection against C. Itoh's precise duplication of DEC products. Id. at 25-
25; see also supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text (discussing legislative policy underlying
Lanham Trademark Act). The Lanham Act's legislative history indicates that Congress sought
to provide governmental safeguards against consumer confusion over product source. See supra
notes 43-45. The Lanham Act's legislative history further implies that Congress did not intend
for manufacturers to bear a heavy burden in ensuring trademark protection. Id.
218. See supra notes 158 & 217 and accompanying text (discussing major investment that
DEC made in product promotion). In Digital Equipment Corporation v. C. Itoh & Company,
the Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) asserted that it spent millions of dollars in promoting
the VT220 product line. DEC, No. 84-5317, slip op. at 13. Despite DEC's investment in the
creation and promotion of a distinctive appearance for the VT220, the DEC court refused to
grant §43(a) protection for the VT220. Id. at 24-25. The DEC court thus implicitly shifted the
burden to DEC to create other means of protecting the public's association of the VT220's
appearance with DEC.
219. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text (discussing trademark policy of
preventing consumer confusion and safeguarding manufacturer product recognition).
220. See DEC, No. 84-5317, slip op. at 13-14, 24-25 (manufacturer failed to gain
trademark protection for product configuration despite great investment by manufacturer in
effort to create distinctive configuration). In Digital Equipment Corporation v. C. Itoh &
Company, the court found that the plaintiff, DEC, invested heavily in promoting DEC multi-
user systems and personal computer product lines. Id. Forcing computer manufacturers to bear
the primary burden in creating §43(a) protection would necessitate altering or increasing millions
of dollars of promotional and design expenditures with a resulting heavy impact on product pric-
ing and marketing strategy. See Id. (DEC's initial investment of millions of dollars in creation
of distinctive product configuration failed to satisfy existing legal criteria for trademark protec-
tion of configuration).
221. See supra notes 120-25 and accompanying text (DEC court focused exclusively on
anticompetitive ramifications of granting §43(a) protection and ignored manufacturer and
consumer trademark interests supporting protection).
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in the configuration of computer video terminals and keyboards. 222 Free
competition, however, does not depend on identical replication of the
appearance of the functional features. 223 Federal courts facing computer
product configuration disputes similar to the dispute in DEC should not
strain against finding only insignificant levels of functionality and deny
trademark protection when no discernible increase in the level of free
competition occurs as a result of the denial of the trademark monopoly. 2 4
Similarly, courts should not impose the highest possible standards in the
test for secondary meaning by requiring actual secondary meaning. 2 5 In
the relatively new consumer computer markets, only minimal actual
secondary meaning is likely to have attached to computer product fea-
tures. 226 The courts should recognize that distinctiveness or potential
secondary meaning suffices for purposes of promoting the policy under-
lying the secondary meaning requirement. 227 Finally, circumstances unique
to the emerging consumer computer markets require courts to become
attentive to consumer sophistication and to the adequacy of labeling in
the test for a likelihood of confusion. 228 In modern computer markets,
consumer sophistication and the associated degree of purchaser care span
a wide range from sophisticated academic, business, and scientific buyers
222. See DEC, No. 84-5317, slip op. at 8 (noting that some appearance similarity between
prime market product and emulation is necessary to enhance operational interchangeability of
competing products). As the court in Digital Equipment Corp. v. C. Itoh & Co. explained,
fair competition between the initial computer product manufacturer and the emulator requires
a certain amount of similarity in order for users to transfer efficiently acquired skills among
the competing products. Id. The DEC court additionally noted, however, that efficient transfer
of skills does not require identical replication of the computer product configuration. Id.
223. See Id. at 8 (finding that emulator product need not be identical to prime market
product for user to successfully transfer skills from prime market product to emulator); see
supra notes 137-44 and accompanying text (arguing that exact duplication of product features
must be indispensible to effective competition in order for prohibition of exact duplication to
have adverse impact on competition).
224. See DEC, No. 84-5317, slip op. at 5, 11 (DEC court found that emulators currently
receive billions of dollars in revenue for emulations without exact duplication of emulated
products' configurations); see also supra notes 137-51 and accompanying text (citing opinions
of federal circuit courts of appeal that refused to hold product configuration functional absent
indication that exact duplication is indispensible to effective competition).
225. See DEC, No. 84-5317, slip op. at 24 (holding that only actual secondary meaning,
not mere distinctiveness or potential secondary meaning, suffices to satisfy secondary meaning
test).
226. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing explosive growth of consumer
computer markets in last decade).
227. See supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text (arguing that distinctiveness and
potential secondary meaning should satisfy §43(a) secondary meaning test).
228. See Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. American Cyanamid Co., 361 F.Supp. 1032,
1043-45 (D.N.J. 1973) (consumers buying on impulse are more likely than sophisticated buyers
to reach inappropriate conclusions with respect to product source); Habitat Design Holdings,
Ltd. v. Habitat Inc., 436 F.Supp 327, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (holding that consumers in retail
settings reflect low level of purchaser sophistication); see also supra note 9 and accompanying
text (discussing wide span of consumer sophistication in demographics of computer markets
in 1980s).
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to children. 29 Further, although many computer products prominently
display name labels, the names displayed frequently are acronyms that
consumers can easily confuse with other computer industry acronyms.
2 0
Federal trademark law exists to prevent consumer confusion; in section
43(a) disputes over unregistered computer product configurations, the
federal courts should favor granting and protecting trademark rights.
23'
JAmmS K. VINES
229. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing wide span of consumer
sophistication in demographics of computer markets in 1980s).
230. See supra note 200 and accompanying text (noting predominance of acronyms for
products and companies in computer industry).
231. See generally, Swift, Stella's Birthday in THE PENGUIN BOOK OF IRISH VERSE 121-22
(B. Kennelly 2d ed. 1981). In his poem "Stella's Birthday," Jonathan Swift, Irish satirist of
the early eighteenth century, captures the fundamental unfairness of duplicating a successful
merchant's identifying mark. Id. Swift, a cleric, apparently considered the duplication an act
of treachery:
All travellers at first incline
Where'er they see the fairest sign,
And if they frind the chambers neat,
And like the liquor and the meat,
Will call again, and recommend
The Angel Inn to every friend.
And though the painting grows decay'd,
The house will never lose its trade:
Nay, though the treach'rous tapster, Thomas,
Hangs a new Angel two doors from us,
As fine as daubers' hands can make it,
In hopes that strangers may mistake it,
We think it both a shame and sin
To quit the true old Angel Inn. Id.
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